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Do bank bailouts have an impact 




We explore the effects of bank bailouts on competition in the underwriting business. We 
exploit a sample of underwriters active in the European corporate bond markets from 
2006–2013 and find that reputable underwriters suffer market share losses (of 12.43%) 
after being bailed out. However, the market share of non-reputable underwriters is found 
to increase after a bail out. An exploration of the firm–bank underwriting matching 
reveals that the probability of being chosen as underwriter in a given deal decreases for 
reputable bailed-out banks, while it increases for non-reputable bailed-out banks. These 
results provide evidence of the effects of bailouts on underwriting competition. The 
economic impact depends on the ex-ante reputational capital of the bailed-out bank.  
Keywords: underwriters, bailout, reputation, recapitalization 






























The 2007–2008 financial crisis led to the implementation of large bank bailout 
programs across a number of economies. Despite their main purpose of restoring financial 
stability and bank soundness, these bailouts have had unintended effects on bank 
competition (Berger & Roman, 2015; Calderon & Schaeck, 2016; Koetter & Noth, 2016). 
Prior studies have examined these effects by focusing on banks’ role as deposit takers and 
credit providers (Berger & Roman, 2015; Black & Hazelwood, 2013; Hakenes & 
Schnabel, 2010; Li, 2013). However, together with these traditional banking activities, 
underwriting has become a substantial revenue-generating activity for many banks. For 
investment banks, underwriting1 has traditionally played a key role. However, 
unsurprisingly, many commercial banks have entered the underwriting business at a time 
when other revenue sources have become less noticeable2.  
Because underwriting requires minimal capital investment, its strategic 
importance for banks has grown3. Furthermore, information asymmetries in financial 
markets make underwriting a market for external certification, with implications for 
firms’ access to capital markets.  
The growth in banks’ underwriting arms (Figure I) began around the time of the 
financial crisis of 2007–2008, when some of these institutions had to be bailed out. These 
interventions may also have had unintended effects on banks’ underwriting businesses. 
Moreover, these measures may have implications for the real economy, since firms’ 
                                                          
1 Currently, the expressions “lead underwriter” and “underwriter” are used indistinctly in the industry and the literature. 
In this paper, we use the term “underwriter” to refer to the “lead underwriters” of a deal. While other non-lead members 
could form a syndicate, our analysis is based on the market share of lead underwriters. Because they are chosen by the 
issuer and they are responsible for pricing and certifying the offering, it is the lead underwriter's reputation which is at 
stake. 
2 According to Dealogic, estimated global debt, equity and equity-related fees totaled US$44 billion during the full year 
of 2014 and US$38.4 billion in 2015. 
3 The industry has underlined the growing weight of “capital light” activities such as underwriting in the financial press. 
See e.g. D. Schäfer and T. Alloway’s February 21, 2013 Financial Times article “Mid-tier banks threaten the bulge 
bracket” and L. Noonan’s December 14, 2015 article “Regulatory changes force investment banks into capital light 
activities”. 
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conditions for accessing capital markets may be negatively affected when underwriting 
competition among banks is distorted. However, no empirical evidence regarding this 
issue is available.  
This paper aims to determine whether bailouts affect banks’ competition in the 
underwriting business. This is an important research question because—together with the 
growing strategic importance of this business for banks—the way in which the 
underwriting industry operates has implications for bank reputation (Beatty & Ritter, 
1986; Carter & Manaster, 1990; Fernando, Gatchev, & Spindt, 2005). Reputation acts as 
a certification signal in debt markets. A large body of literature argues that reputation can 
be proxied by an underwriter’s market share (Fang, 2005; Gande, Puri, Saunders, & 
Walter, 1997; McCahery & Schwienbacher, 2010; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Schenone, 
2004). Thus, the reputational implications of being bailed out may impact banks’ market 
shares. We address this question by examining the effects of bailout programs on banks’ 
market shares as underwriters, employing a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis. 
Our approach differs from the existing literature on bank bailouts and 
underwriting. Previous research has shown that bailouts may affect banks’ market shares 
(Allen, Carletti, & Marquez, 2011; Berger & Bouwman, 2013; Berger & Roman, 2015). 
Additionally, research on underwriting has emphasized the certification role of 
underwriters. Banks with ex-ante large market shares—considered within the industry as 
reputable—are aware that poor underwriting performance may damage their reputation 
and decrease their market share in the underwriting business (Booth & Smith, 1986; 
Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998; Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Dong, Michel, & Pandes, 
2011). Combining these two strands of literature, we hypothesize that bank bailout 
programs are likely to affect underwriting market shares, but the effects may differ 
depending on the ex-ante market share and reputational capital of the bailed-out bank. 
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Our analysis contributes to the extant literature on bank bailouts by explaining the 
potential unintended effects of bailout programs on the underwriting business. 
Additionally, this paper contributes to the underwriting literature by exploring how 
certification-reputational concerns may affect underwriters’ market shares following 
public recapitalization. 
The empirical analysis relies on a panel of 121 underwriters active in the European 
corporate bond markets during the 2006–2013 period. Unlike previous studies, the 
analysis is not focused on a specific bailout program (e.g. the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program, TARP). We consider all the bailout programs that affect the sample of active 
underwriters. This is justified by the fact that banks from all over the world compete in 
this market, making the European underwriting industry less concentrated and more 
competitive than that in the US4. Although a certain degree of fragmentation in European 
initial public offering (IPO) markets has been shown (Vismara, Paleari, & Ritter, 2012), 
we provide evidence of a non-fragmented European underwriting industry for corporate 
bonds. 
Additionally, in the DID analysis, we control for the financial strength of the bank. 
We also account for specific quantitative and qualitative factors that drive underwriting 
market shares. Furthermore, we employ bond-level data to examine the firm–bank 
matching, which allows us to observe changes in underwriting volumes between each 
bailed-out underwriter and firm pair. 
By way of preview, we find that those banks with large market shares, considered 
in the industry as reputable underwriters, suffer decreases in their underwriting market 
share (of 12.43% on average) after being bailed out. However, those with smaller market 
                                                          
4 According to Dealogic, during the period 2003–2013, the Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI) for corporate bonds in 
the European underwriting industry was 0.4, while in the US it was 0.8. Similarly, the ten largest underwriters in Europe 
represent 56% of the market, while in the US they account for 82%. 
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shares, considered as non-reputable underwriters, increase their market share after being 
bailed out (of 36.28% on average). These results are confirmed by the firm–bank 
matching analysis. In particular, we find that reputable bailed-out banks experience 
market shares’ losses since then are 2.4% less likely to win new mandates and 26.3% less 
likely to retain prior mandates. Conversely, less reputable bailed-out banks are 9.3% more 
likely to be chosen in new mandates and 5% for more likely to retain prior mandates. Our 
results are found to be robust to different reputation measures, identifications, intensities 
of government support, endogeneity concerns and self-selection biases. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature. The hypotheses and research questions are presented in Section 3. Section 4 
describes the data and methodology. The empirical results are presented in Section 5. 
Section 6 examines the firm–bank underwriting matching. Section 7 provides additional 
results considering alternatives measures of underwriters’ reputation. Section 8 offers 
robustness checks and Section 9 concludes. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1. The impact of bank bailout programs 
Previous research has examined the determinants of whether a bank will be bailed 
out and the effects thereof. A primary and expected finding is that the financial health of 
the bank is a determinant of whether it will be bailed out (Bayazitova & Shivdasani, 2012; 
Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian, 2011; Gerhardt & Vennet, 2017). Beccalli & 
Frantz (2016) find that public bailouts occur for larger but less liquid banks that operate 
in large banking sectors. Similarly, Zanzalari (2015) shows that banks are more likely to 
be bailed out if they have low Tier-1 capital ratios, low ROAs and large exposure to real 
estate markets. In the case of TARP, it has also been found that political connections may 
affect the likelihood of a bank receiving public funds (Bayazitova & Shivdasani, 2012; 
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Berger, Makaew, & Roman, 2018; Berger & Roman, 2015, 2017; Duchin & Sosyura, 
2014; Li, 2013). 
A number of studies have also explored the impact of bank bailouts on 
competition. The role of capital in bank competition has been widely studied, both 
theoretically and empirically (see for example Allen et al., 2011; Berger & Bouwman, 
2013; Koetter & Noth, 2016). An increase in bank capital may generate a competitive 
advantage, distorting the level of competition. Previous studies have found that public 
capital increases have a positive effect on banks’ market shares or ability to compete. 
Berger & Roman (2015) show that beneficiaries of TARP in the US enjoyed a competitive 
advantage that led them to increase their loan market shares by 9.14%. Similarly, 
Calderon & Schaeck (2016) find that recapitalizations increased the market shares of 
“zombie banks” by 5%. Koetter & Noth (2016) also show competitive distortions as a 
result of TARP for non-TARP banks. 
Some studies have examined the effects of public bailouts on lending. A number 
of these studies focus on credit supply at the extensive margin (credit quantities) and 
obtain mixed results. Li (2013) suggests that TARP investments increased banks’ loan 
supplies (by an annualized rate of 6.36%). Berger & Roman (2017) also find an increase 
in banks’ credit supplies, especially in commercial real estate lending. Berger, Makaew, 
& Roman (2018) suggest that the probability of banks issuing loans increased during the 
post-TARP period. However, Duchin & Sosyura (2014) and Bassett, Demiralp, & Lloyd 
(2017) do not find any effects of public bailouts on credit supply. As for the intensive 
margin (credit conditions of the loans granted to borrowers), Berger, Makaew, & Roman 
(2018) find that TARP banks grant loans with more favorable terms, i.e. lower interest 
rate spreads, larger amounts, longer maturities, less frequency of collateral and less 
restrictive covenants.  
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 Some related studies have examined the effects of bailout programs on bank risk-
taking (Black & Hazelwood, 2013; Duchin & Sosyura, 2014; Hakenes & Schnabel, 2010; 
Li, 2013), financial stability (Berger, Roman, & Sedunov, 2019), liquidity creation 
(Berger, Bouwman, Kick, & Schaeck, 2016) and banks’ stocks valuation (Bertsatos, 
Sakellaris, & Tsionas, 2017; King, 2019; Liu, Kolari, Kyle Tippens, & Fraser, 2013; 
Veronesi & Zingales, 2010).  
2.2. Banks’ underwriting role in capital markets 
Banks perform an intermediary function as underwriters, mitigating information 
asymmetries between insiders and outsiders. Underwriters do not merely distribute 
securities among investors; they perform a number of functions, including marketing, 
certification and screening (Dong et al., 2011).  
Some theoretical contributions have shown that the underwriting function of 
commercial and investment banks is linked to their reputation (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; 
Booth & Smith, 1986; Carter & Manaster, 1990; Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). The so-
called “certification hypothesis” argues that underwriters certify the intrinsic value of an 
issuance due to their reputation (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998; 
Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Dong, Michel, & Pandes, 2011). Reputational concerns 
partially explain underwriters’ avoidance of opportunistic behavior that could negatively 
affect their reputation. These same concerns discourage underwriters from misusing 
private information to improve their short-term performance. Reputable underwriters 
implement standards to assess the quality of issuers in order to prevent poor future 
performances (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). Thus, reputation—as an intangible 
long-term asset—may fluctuate over longer or shorter periods of time as a result of shocks 
that affect bank performance. 
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Additionally, underwriter reputation explains how firms and underwriters are 
matched (Carbó-Valverde, Cuadros-Solas, & Rodríguez-Fernández, 2017; Drucker & 
Puri, 2005; Fernando, Gatchev, May, & Megginson, 2015; Fernando, Gatchev, & Spindt, 
2005; Ljungqvist, Marston, & Wilhelm, 2006; Yasuda, 2005, 2007), why underwriters 
are replaced in subsequent offerings (Humphery-Jenner, Karpavicius, & Suchard, 2018; 
Krigman, Shaw, & Womack, 2001) and why issuers prefer to engage with reputable 
underwriters (Burch, Nanda, & Warther, 2005; Fang, 2005; Fernando, May, & 
Megginson, 2012; McCahery & Schwienbacher, 2010; Neupane & Thapa, 2013). Thus, 
the literature on capital markets agrees that reputation plays a central role in the 
underwriting business. 
In addition, there is general consensus that reputability assists in capturing market 
share. All market participants—issuers, investors, analysts, rating agencies and 
underwriters—recognize reputable underwriters as those with large market shares. This 
is primarily because third-party perceptions of reputation attract business. More reputable 
underwriters attract more underwriting contracts, which consequently leads to growth in 
their market shares5,6. Reputable underwriters are prominent participants in the bond 
market, which is consistent with the existence of a positive relationship between market 
share and reputation (Dunbar, 2000). Furthermore, the consistency of market share in the 
financial markets as a measure of reputation is supported by the use of this measure in the 
syndication loan market for lead arrangers (Sufi, 2007) and for advisors in mergers and 
acquisitions (Rau, 2000). 
                                                          
5 Beatty & Ritter (1986) relate reputation and market share, arguing that underwriters that place deals with initial returns 
inconsistent with their ex-ante uncertainty subsequently lose market share. 
6 Market share was first used to measure reputation in a seminal paper of Megginson & Weiss (1991), leading to the 
so-called “MW measure”. Megginson & Weiss highlight the consistency of their measure, as it was found to be strongly 
positively correlated to the Caster-Manaster measure. 
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3. THE IMPACT OF BANK BAILOUTS ON UNDERWRITING MARKET 
SHARES 
In order to analyze the impact of bailouts on banks’ underwriting market shares, 
it is important to simultaneously consider the channels through which public capital 
infusions affect market shares and the certification-reputational concerns that exist within 
the underwriting industry. 
3.1. Channels through which bailouts affect market share 
Following Berger & Roman (2015), there are some channels through which 
banks’ market shares in the underwriting business may increase or decrease. 
Strengthening banks’ capital may generate a competitive advantage that would lead 
beneficiaries of state aid recapitalization measures to increase their market shares due to 
a predation, a safety or a cost-advantage channel. The predation channel allows bailed-
out banks to use capital infusions to compete more aggressively by offering better 
conditions, thus increasing their market shares. The safety channel is based on the 
constant scrutiny from the public sector that is a consequence of being bailed out. Public 
scrutiny would reduce bank risk-taking, so that recapitalized underwriters are perceived 
as “safer” (i.e. less likely to repeat poor performances in future). Consequently, firms may 
contract the underwriting services of recapitalized banks due to their perceived safety. 
Finally, the cost-advantage channel is founded on banks’ perceptions of the capital 
received as having a lower cost. This may lead banks to take advantage of these relatively 
costless funds to expand their businesses.  
Bailed-out banks may also suffer market share losses. This may happen because 
banks, seeing their survival at stake, may adopt a less aggressive strategy, which would 
result in lower market shares (the ‘quiet life’ or risk-averse channel). Alternatively, a 
stigma channel may operate, which is the opposite of the safety channel. Specifically, 
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being bailed out may generate a negative signal regarding the resilience of the bank, 
which may make firms reluctant to request a bailed-out bank’s services. Finally, a cost-
disadvantage channel may operate when banks perceive the funds received to be costly, 
which would lead bailed-out banks to downsize their businesses.  
There is empirical evidence of the positive effects of bailouts on the extensive 
margin of credit supply (Berger, Makaew, & Roman, 2018; Berger & Roman, 2017; Li, 
2013). Furthermore, Berger & Roman (2015) find that bailed-out banks increase their 
lending market shares after receiving TARP funds. They suggest that their results are 
driven primarily by the safety channel.  
3.2. The certification-reputational channel in the underwriting industry 
Reputation is a valuable asset for underwriters, as their credibility as certifiers 
relies on it. Poor performances negatively affect the future volume of underwriting 
business (Booth & Smith, 1986; Carter & Manaster, 1990). There is evidence that 
declines in market share can be attributed to losses in reputational capital. For example, 
the scandal involving Salomon Brothers’ bond business led the bank to lose market share 
in the underwriting industry (Smith, 1992). Beatty, Bunsis, & Hand (1998) show that it 
is not only consummated scandals that negatively affect banks’ market shares; it is enough 
to be publicly targeted as a subject of formal investigation. Similarly, and more recently, 
Hanley & Hoberg (2012) find that underwriters that have been the target of a lawsuit 
experience market share declines. Reputational concerns have also been found to lead 
banks to reject a recapitalization offer (Corbett & Mitchell, 2000). Banks are aware of the 
stigma attached to participating in government programs, as this participation could mean 
admitting financial weakness (Philippon & Skreta, 2012). It has also been shown that 
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during a period of financial turmoil, trust in banks declines7, which may lead to a more 
severe loss of trust for troubled banks (Sapienza & Zingales, 2012). Bank customers 
response to government interventions (Hasan, Jackowicz, Kowalewski, & Kozłowski, 
2013; van der Cruijsen & Diepstraten, 2017). Diepstraten & Cruijsen, (2019) find that 
current account holders of the recapitalized bank are more likely to switch away shortly 
after the bail-out. In the banking industry, Fiordelisi, Soana, & Schwizer (2013, 2014) 
document reputational losses in Europe and North America following operational losses.  
In a similar vein, investors’ reactions to reputational shocks for credit rating 
agencies, which also play a role in mitigating information asymmetries, have been 
documented in several crises (Bedendo, Cathcart, & El-jahel, 2018). Hence, in the 
banking industry, and especially in the underwriting industry, third parties seem to 
penalize financial institutions when they behave inappropriately.  
3.3. Ex-ante reputational capital 
The impact of state aid measures on a bailed-out bank’s market share may differ 
depending on certain ex-ante characteristics of the bank. Black & Hazelwood (2013) and 
Berger & Bouwman (2013) find that public capital injections generate different effects 
for large and small banks. Small and less reputable banks use bailout funds to increase 
lending and market share, leading to a competitive advantage for them. Dunbar (2000) 
and Ljungqvist et al. (2006) suggest that large and well-established banks are more 
exposed to losses in reputational capital. In a similar vein, Gopalan, Nanda, & Yerramilli 
(2011) find different effects for large and small lead arrangers in the syndicate loan 
market, which they interpret as a key difference in the way in which the reputation 
mechanism operates. 
                                                          
7 There are some studies on the distrust of banks during the financial crisis. Carbó-Valverde, Maqui-López, & 
Rodriguez-Fernandez (2013) examine the Spanish banking system, Mosch & Prast (2008) the Dutch banking system 
and Knell & Stix (2009) the Austrian banking system. 
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Hence, reputational capital is not distributed homogeneously among underwriters. 
Some are perceived as reputable, while others are not. Thus, while there is a certification-
reputational channel in the underwriting industry, it may affect banks differently 
depending on their ex-ante reputational capital. Consequently, the impact of bailout 
measures would differ for highly reputable banks (with large market shares) and for less 
reputable banks (with smaller market shares). The changes in the market shares of 
recapitalized underwriters from 2008 onwards, shown in Figure II, seem to reveal 
different patterns depending on the underwriters’ prior reputations. 
Banks with large underwriting market shares may experience a decrease in their 
market share, because they have more to lose due to their greater reputational capital. 
Such decreases may occur because the certification-reputational channel would outweigh 
other channels. However, for less reputable banks that do not have significant ex-ante 
reputational capital, a public capital injection may act as a competitive advantage. Thus, 
the effect of public scrutiny leading them to be perceived as safer may lead them to 
increase their market share.  
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our primary data source is a sample of underwriters that issue fixed corporate 
bonds, obtained from the Dealogic Debt Capital Markets database. The sample excludes 
deals issued by utilities and regulated firms (SIC: 4000s) and financial firms (SIC: 6000s). 
The time period is 2006–2013, which allows us to explore the effects of the banking crisis, 
in addition to covering all of the bailout programs undertaken as a consequence thereof. 
We match each bank with the information on its accounting statements provided by 
Bankscope. We also account for the lender–borrower connection of each underwriter by 
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using Thomson ONE to obtain information on their lending activity. The final sample 
includes 121 bond underwriters.  
We follow the methodology employed in Huyghebaert & Xu (2015) to deal with 
mergers and acquisitions that took place during the sample period. Merger information 
was collected from Bankscope, Lexis-Nexis and banks’ own information sources8. If one 
underwriter has acquired another bank, we use different codes for the acquired bank and 
the acquirer before the acquisition, while the acquiring bank’s code is used after the 
acquisition. If two banks have merged to form a new bank, we employ a different code 
for the bank created after the merger. Finally, for name changes in which no merger or 
takeover were involved, we use the same code for the bank before and after the name 
change.  
Table I indicates the yearly distribution of our panel of underwriters, as well as 
the top five underwriters by market share. We consider an underwriter as active in a 
particular year if it placed at least one deal during that year. Our data indicate that the 
number of active underwriters rose from 38 in 2006 to 94 in 2013. Furthermore, the league 
table rankings are topped each year by well-established banks, namely Deutsche Bank, 
Barclays, JP Morgan, HSBC, Citi, BNP Paribas, RBS and Société Générale. Finally, it is 
shown that the average market share fell from 2.69% in 2006 to 1.10% in 2013. 
As far as we know, there is no updated database listing all the financial institutions 
that were bailed out during the recent financial crisis. The data are dispersed, since these 
measures were adopted by different national governments and supranational institutions 
according to their respective competencies. Therefore, we manually collected data from 
several sources, depending on the nationality of the underwriter: 
                                                          
8 We identify prior lending and underwriting relationships accounting for mergers between underwriters. For example, 
for Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch on January 1, 2009, we use different codes for the acquired bank 
and the acquirer before the acquisition. As of the acquisition date, the resulting entity Bank of America Merrill Lynch 
absorbs all relationships from both predecessor banks. 
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 EU underwriters: Data source: European Commission, State Aid Control. The 
European Commission has a State Aid Control Section, which is primarily integrated 
by the Directorate-General for Competition9. All state aids are publicly viewable 
through a multi-criteria search tool that provides access to all the cases that have been 
the objects of a Commission decision since 1 January 200010. Using this tool, we 
tracked all the state aids granted in the EU to financial firms during the research period 
(K.64 Financial service activities). 
 U.S. underwriters: Data source: Emergency Economic Stabilization Act TARP, U.S. 
Department of the Treasury. In October 2008, the U.S. Congress authorized TARP, 
allocating a maximum of US$700 billion to buy assets and equity from financial 
institutions with the aim of increasing the stability of the financial sector. We tracked 
all the programs11 approved under TARP in order to determine which U.S. banks were 
bailed out during the research period. 
 Swiss underwriters: Data source: Swiss National Bank (SNB).  
 Other underwriters: Data source: Publicly available data sources (central banks, 
governments, bank websites, treasuries and restructuring agencies). 
 Following earlier studies, we generate annual dummies, which take the value 1 if 
the underwriting bank received an injection of equity from the state considered as eligible 
Core Tier 1 Capital. In the Appendix, Table B describes all the recapitalization processes 
                                                          
9 Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contains a general prohibition of state 
aids in order to not distort competition and trade within the EU. However, under some circumstances, governments can 
intervene to offset market failure. With the aim of controlling these aids, the European Commission created the State 
Aid Control Section. 
10 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm 
11 Programs approved under TARP include the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the Automotive Industry Financing 
Program (AIFP), the AIG Investment Program, the Targeted Investment Program (TIP), the Mortgage Loan 
Modification Plan, the Public–Private Investment Program (PIP), the Housing Finance Agency Innovation Fund, the 
Federal Housing Administration Refinance Program, the Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI), the Auto 
Supplier Support Program, the Small Business and Community Lending Initiative, the Term Asset-Backed Securities 
Loan Facility (TALF), the Asset Guarantee Program (AGP), the Securities Purchase Program, the Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program (SCAP) and the Capital Assistance Program (CAP). 
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implemented amongst our sample of underwriters12. We report 64 recapitalization 
measures from 2006–2013, concerning 36 banks and a total amount of over €350 billion. 
As some banks were recipients of more than one recapitalization measure during the same 
natural year, we ended up with 55 year–recapitalization observations. As expected, most 
of these recapitalizations took place during the period starting in September 2008, after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and ending in December 2010. During this period, the 
structural deficit in the Eurozone reached 15% of GDP, and the European sovereign debt 
crisis began. After December 2010, only amendments to previously approved 
recapitalization measures were made, as Table B.I shows. 
 Table II provides definitions and summary statistics for the variables. As could be 
expected, this table shows that bailed-out banks are larger in size, less profitable and less 
liquid. 
4.2. Empirical modelling 
 The effects of bailout measures on underwriters’ market share are examined using 
a DID analysis. The aim is to compare the evolution of the market shares of state-aid-
recapitalized underwriters and non-recapitalized underwriters. Recent studies have used 
a similar approach to examine the effects of state capital injections in the banking sector 
(Berger et al., 2018; Berger & Roman, 2015, 2017; Black & Hazelwood, 2013; Duchin 
& Sosyura, 2014; Montgomery & Takahashi, 2014; Nakashima, 2016; Poczter, 2016). 
By employing this approach, we control for observable and unobservable factors that 
affect both groups of banks. 
In line with prior studies (Berger et al., 2018; Berger, Roman, & Sedunov, 2019; 
Berger & Roman, 2015; 2017; Duchin & Sosyura, 2014; Montgomery & Takahashi, 
                                                          
12 For example, the German bank HSH Nordbank was recapitalized in 2008 and 2009, but it does not appear on the list 
because it did not place any corporate bonds during the 2007–2013 period. 
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2014), our treatment group consists of underwriters that received state aid equity during 
the period starting with the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008). The treatment 
period encompasses the entire TARP program in the US, as well as the bulk of the 
recapitalization programs in Europe. 
Since some banks were recapitalized repeatedly during our sample period, we 
examine the effects of state aid recapitalization on underwriters’ market share using a 
generalized DID approach that deals with multiple events (bailouts). This approach, 
employed in Bertrand and Mullainathan's (2003) seminal paper and subsequently used in 
several studies (Chen & Vashishtha, 2017; Fang, Hasan, & Marton, 2014; Francis, Hasan, 
John, & Waisman, 2010; Haselmann, Pistor, & Vig, 2010), addresses many threats to the 
validity of our analysis. We estimate the following equation (1): 
Mkt. Shareit =  α +  β1 Recapitalizedit + β2Xit−1  +  β3Timet + β4Underwriteri +  εit 
(1) 
The dependent variable is the market share of underwriter i in year t. 
Recapitalizedit, is an indicator variable equal to 1 when and after a bank 𝑖 receives a public 
capital injection at year 𝑡, and 0 otherwise. This variable serves as the DID operator with 
precise timing of the bailouts of each bank. This methodology fully controls for fixed 
differences between treated and non-treated banks via the underwriter fixed effects, 
removing biases that could be due to other omitted time-invariant factors rather than 
bailouts. We also include time fixed effects to control for aggregate fluctuations in market 
shares over time. In particular, this generalized DID approach allows us to account for 
the fact that some banks were recapitalized strictly before December 2010 (e.g. those 
recapitalized through TARP funds) while others (e.g. some of the European banks) were 
recapitalized repeatedly before and after December 2010. Moreover, by employing this 
methodology, no bank is excluded from the analysis on the grounds that they were 
recapitalized later. 
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In order to explore how the bailout effect on market share varies depending on the 
underwriter’s ex-ante reputation level, we employ the following equation (2): 




 An underwriter is considered Reputablei if it ranks among the top five underwriters 
based on market share, and it equals zero otherwise. Following prior studies (Andres, 
Betzer, & Limbach, 2014; Fang, 2005; Livingston & Miller, 2000; McCahery & 
Schwienbacher, 2010; Narayanan, Rangan, & Rangan, 2006; Yasuda, 2005), we use a 
discrete measure based on market share to identify highly reputable underwriters. As Fang 
(2005) argues, this measure best captures the market structure, because banks in capital 
markets are commonly seen as either heavyweight players or not. Given the aim of the 
test, in order to classify an underwriter as reputable, we use the pre-bailout (or pre-
treatment) period market shares. Using market share measured at any point during the 
post-treatment (post-bailout) period would be inappropriate, given that our aim is to 
measure ex-post changes in market share during the post-bailout period relative to the 
pre-bailout period. Pre-bailout market shares are computed on annual proceeds raised in 
the corporate bond markets from 2006 to September 2008 (before the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers as the triggering event of the financial crisis)13. Then, the interaction 
Recapitalizeditx Reputablei is the DID term, which takes the value 1 when and after the 
underwriter received a bailout and the underwriter ranks among the top five underwriters 
based on the pre-bailout market shares. In equation (2), the firm fixed effects capture pre-
bailout differences that may affect underwriter reputation. 
                                                          
13 According to their pre-bailout market shares, Deutsche Bank, RBS, JP Morgan, HSBC and Citi are ranked in the top 
five positions during the pre-bailout period. 
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Furthermore, the standard errors reported are robust to heteroscedasticity. Since 
the variance of the error term may be larger for reputable underwriters with larger market 
share than it is for less reputable underwriters with smaller market share, we cluster the 
standard errors by underwriter. 
4.3. Variables 
4.3.1 Dependent variable: Market share 
 Market shares are computed on a proceeds base, in which the proceeds of 
syndicated bonds are divided among all the underwriters. One concern about using market 
shares in Europe could be the existence of a fragmented market at a national level, as 
Vismara et al. (2012) find for IPOs. In this sense, the presence of national local 
underwriters that operate almost exclusively in a single country would bias our result, 
because their reputation would be high in their domestic market, but lower abroad. 
Although European debt markets seem to be less fragmented than European IPO markets, 
we address this issue. In order to detect possible bias, we compute bonds denominated in 
the national currency of the issuer, underwritten by domestic banks and sold into the 
domestic market. In general, as Table A.I reveals, while IPOs are chiefly domestic deals 
placed by a single underwriter, bonds are typically marketed internationally by a 
syndicate. In our sample, domestic bonds represent just 4% of proceeds and 12% (288 
bonds out of 2,457) of the total number of deals. Domestic bonds are smaller in size on 
average14. 
Furthermore, following Migliorati & Vismara (2014), we compute the national 
rankings for the core European economies (Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, 
and Spain), with the aim of detecting whether there are national local underwriters (banks 
                                                          
14 In our sample, the average issue size of domestic bonds is $157.69 million, while for non-domestic bonds the average 
size is $565.61 million. 
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with large market shares in their domestic markets but small market shares at the 
European level). Table A.I provides a per-country overview of all the underwriters with 
a global market share lower than 1%. These underwriters have small market shares in 
both international and domestic markets15.  
We also perform a matched-pairs t-test on means equality16 across national 
markets, and we do not find evidence of significant differences. Large differences across 
national markets would likely lead to differences in market structure. Thus, we compute 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for each market. No noticeable differences among 
markets are found.  
4.3.2 Explanatory variables 
4.3.2.1. Determinants of underwriters’ market shares 
Together with variables reflecting the financial strength of the bank, we control 
for specific quantitative and qualitative factors that drive underwriting market shares. The 
effects of several quantitative and qualitative determinants on market share changes in 
the US are examined in Dunbar (2000). Furthermore, Liu & Ritter (2011) present 
empirical evidence in support of their theoretical predictions of issuers’ willingness to 
receive pricing (quantitative) and non-pricing (qualitative) underwriting services. As for 
debt issues, Ang & Zhang (2004) also provide evidence of pricing and non-pricing 
competition among underwriters, while in the equity markets Fernando et al. (2015) find 
differences in prices and the services provided depending on the underwriter’s reputation. 
Chen, Shi, & Xu (2014) and Huyghebaert & Xu (2015) show that non-pricing factors— 
the quality of the services provided and public ownership—influence market shares in 
                                                          
15 For example, we can see that the largest market share in a domestic market—held by the Italian bank Mediobanca, 
3.42%—does not place this bank high in the Italian ranking. Moreover, Mediobanca has a presence in other markets, 
such as the French and German markets. 
16 H0 : µcountry i = µEurope ; i = France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain.  
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China, while Migliorati & Vismara (2014) also consider these factors as determinants of 
the underwriting rankings in the main European stock markets. 
As for pricing factors, following the most closely related studies on underwriters’ 
market shares (Dunbar, 2000; Huyghebaert & Xu, 2015), we build a variable called 
abnormal fees in order to account for a pricing strategy. Using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), we run annual regressions considering all fees charged in a three-year rolling 
window as dependent variable17. Using the coefficients of these regressions, we obtain 
predicted fees, which are then subtracted from the observed fees. Finally, for each 
underwriter, we compute the average abnormal fees charged in a three-year window using 
the underwriter’s gross proceeds as weighting factor. In a similar vein, we build a variable 
called abnormal spread18 to control for underwriters’ bond valuations.19 
As for qualitative factors, we control for the quality of the underwriter’s research 
team by employing the variable number of total star analysts based on the Institutional 
Investor awards20. A positive relationship between analyst reputation and research quality 
is assumed (C. Chen et al., 2014; L. H. Fang & Yasuda, 2014; Krigman et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, we also account for banks’ lending arms with the variables UW Lender and 
Lending Market Share. This is because banks currently offer lending and underwriting 
services simultaneously, and there could be cross-service complementarities (Corwin & 
Stegemoller, 2014; Duarte-Silva, 2010). Additionally, the underwriters’ degree of 
specialization in issuing bonds in a specific industry could affect their market shares. 
                                                          
17 Table A.II reports the empirical modelling conducted to compute abnormal fees. The results of the estimations are 
not shown to conserve space, but are available upon request.  
18 Table A.II reports the empirical modelling conducted to compute abnormal spreads. The results of the estimations 
are not shown to conserve space, but are available upon request. 
19 Alternatively, for robustness purposes, we computed abnormal fees and abnormal spreads using a two-year window 
in unreported regressions. Similar results were obtained. 
20 The magazine Institutional Investor surveys 21 sectors and identifies the top-ranked analysts. The ranked analysts 
are divided into several categories: first, second, third and runner-up. 
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Hence, we control for underwriters’ industry specialization by computing a Herfindahl-
Hirschman index for each underwriter (HHI Industry specialization).  
We also include a further set of controls with the aim of accounting for additional 
deal and underwriter features to ensure that the main results do not hinge upon the 
omission of variables. We control for private placements with the weighted ratio of 
placement deals, since being highly active in placing these deals may reflect a capacity to 
attract sophisticated investors who could also attract issuers. Additionally, we control for 
multiple underwritten deals with the weighted ratio of these deals.  
4.3.2.2. Determinants of underwriters’ financial health 
We employ a set of financial ratios to account for the different dimensions of the 
underwriter: size, profitability, liquidity, efficiency and capital adequacy. We also control 
for underwriters’ experience by taking into account the number of years since their first 
placement, as well as whether they are listed on a stock exchange21. 
5. RESULTS 
5.1. Difference-in-differences (DID) results 
 The DID estimations are presented in Table III. Columns 1 and 2 report the results 
for the regression of Equation 1, while Columns 3 and 4 present the results for Equation 
2. For Equation 1, we find that Recapitalizedit is positive but not statistically significant. 
Compared to non-recapitalized banks, recapitalized banks did not increase their market 
share after receiving state aid. However, this result should be complemented with the 
findings for Equation 2, in which the effect of being recapitalized on market share is 
separated from underwriter reputation. We find that the coefficient of Recapitalizedit is 
                                                          
21 All the variables are described in Table A.II. Panel C.  
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positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient of Recapitalizedit x Reputablei 
(for reputable underwriters) is negative and statistically significant. These results indicate 
a differential effect of state aid recapitalization depending on underwriter reputation. As 
it could be observed, the impact of a bank bailout for a reputable underwriter is negative 
since the sum of both coefficients remains negative. While reputable recapitalized 
underwriters suffered losses in their market shares after state aid recapitalization, non-
reputable recapitalized underwriters increased their market shares after receiving state 
aid. Therefore, the effect of state aid depends on the underwriter’s prior reputation level. 
Reputable underwriters’ losses in market share are consistent with a certification-
reputational hypothesis. Underwriters with ex-ante large reputational capital are more 
likely to lose market share after recapitalization. Conversely, those underwriters that do 
not have large ex-ante reputational capital use recapitalization as a competitive advantage. 
These results are economically meaningful, since a reputable recapitalized 
underwriter experiences a 12.43% decrease in its market share from its average market 
share. At the same time, the average market share of a non-reputable recapitalized 
underwriter increases by 36.28% following recapitalization. 
Turning to the determinants of underwriters’ market shares, the results obtained 
show that market shares are not driven by price-based competition, as the coefficient of 
abnormal fees and abnormal spreads are non-significant. Interestingly, the impact of 
lending on underwriting market shares is also indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficients of UW Lender. Furthermore, hiring star analysts for the underwriting team 
significantly increases underwriters’ market shares, since the coefficient of number of 
star analysts is positive and statistically significant. These findings are consistent with 
underwriters with large market shares (which are considered reputable) offering high-
quality underwriting services.  
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6. FIRM–BANK UNDERWRITING MATCHING: BOND-LEVEL DATA 
In order to ensure that the impact of state aid measures on a bailed-out bank’s 
underwriting market share differs depending on the bank’s ex-ante reputational capital, 
we also examine the firm–bank underwriting matching. By using bond-level data we are 
able to examine the change in the underwriting volumes between each underwriter–firm 
pair. In doing so, we control for firm characteristics (demand-side factors) and firm fixed 
effects to absorb the change in firms’ demand in issuing bonds, as well as underwriter-
specific characteristics (supply-side factors). This approach has also been employed in 
the banking literature (Khwaja & Mian, 2008; Schnabl, 2012). If, as we hypothesize, 
bailout programs affect underwriting market shares depending on the ex-ante reputational 
capital of the bailed-out bank, the firm–bank matching analysis should show that the 
likelihood of being appointed as underwriter decreases for more reputable bailed-out 
banks and increases for less reputable bailed-out banks after controlling for demand and 
supply factors. 
To conduct this analysis, we collect the bond-level data on fixed corporate bonds 
from the Dealogic Debt Capital Markets database. This comprises 1,611 deals issued by 
323 firms during the period 2006–2013. Using Compustat Global, we obtain the key 
accounting information for each bond issuer. Furthermore, we identify prior firm–bank 
relationships using Dealogic and Thomson ONE. This provides a unique sample with 
detailed information about bond characteristics, firm characteristics, bank characteristics 
and prior firm–bank relationships.  
6.1. Firm-bank matching: Winning a mandate 
In order to address the firm–bank matching, we build a model of the decision to 
choose a bank as bond underwriter from a set of potential underwriters. The choice set 
includes all banks that underwrote at least one bond in the year of the bond issuance. 
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E(Y |X=x)=Pr(𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛 𝑈𝑊=1| X )= Λ (𝛽0+ 𝛽1 Recapitalized Bank+ 𝛽2 Reputable + 
𝛽3 Recapitalized x Reputable + 𝛽4𝑋𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠+ 𝛽5𝑋firm 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 +𝛽6𝑋bank 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠+ 
𝛽7𝑋firm−bank 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑠+  Year FE + Firm FE + 𝑒𝑖 )     (3) 
Our dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the bank is chosen among 
the set of potential underwriters. Following prior studies (Chen & Vashishtha, 2017; 
Croci, Degl’Innocenti, & Zhou, 2019; Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010; Hellmann, 
Lindsey, & Puri, 2008; Kuhnen, 2009) and in order to avoid the incidental parameters 
problem when estimating a binary choice model with fixed effects, we use a conditional 
fixed effects logit model. By doing so, the estimations and the standard errors are 
consistent after including firm and year fixed effects22. All the variables that control for 
bond, firm and bank characteristics, as well as for prior firm–bank relationships, are 
defined in Table A.II in the Appendix. 
Our main variables of interest are Recapitalizedit and the interaction term 
Recapitalizedit x Reputablei, which shows how the effect of being bailed out on the firm–
bank matching varies with the ex-ante reputational capital of the underwriter. The first 
set of control variables includes proxies for bond characteristics to account for possible 
effects of the structure of the bond (e.g. size, maturity, callability, etc.) on the choice of 
underwriter. The second set of control variables includes firm characteristics such as firm 
size, leverage, profitability and experience issuing bonds. By including these variables, 
we control for firms’ demand in issuing bonds. Our third set of control variables captures 
variation in time-variant bank characteristics (supply-side factors). Finally, since firm–
bank relationships affect the likelihood of a firm being appointed as underwriter (Bharath, 
Dahiya, Saunders, & Srinivasan, 2007; Corwin & Schultz, 2005; Drucker & Puri, 2005; 
                                                          
22 For robustness purposes, we have also estimated a linear probability model (LPM) and a probit model without fixed 
effects but using a two-way clustering of standard errors by year and issuer. The results are robust across these 
alternative specifications. 
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Duarte-Silva, 2010; Ljungqvist et al., 2006) we consider the two main relationships that 
a firm may have with a bank, namely those of bond underwriter and lender. Moreover, 
we include firm and year fixed effects to control for unobservable firm characteristics and 
variations in debt financing over time, respectively.  
The results of the firm–bank matching are shown in Table IV. Taking together the 
coefficients and the statistical significance of Recapitalizedit and Recapitalizedit x 
Reputablei, we find that bailed-out banks are more likely to be chosen as underwriters, 
except when the bailed-out bank is highly reputable. Consistent with our expectations 
following the DID regressions, the effect of being bailed out on the firm–bank matching 
varies with the underwriter’s ex-ante reputational capital. Furthermore, we also compute 
the predicted probability of the matching between firms and banks. We find that for 
reputable bailed-out underwriters, the probability of being chosen in a given deal 
decreases by 2.4%, while this same probability increases by 9.3% for less reputable 
bailed-out underwriters. The positive effect of a bailout for non-reputable underwriters is 
stronger than the negative effect thereof for reputable underwriters. This result is in line 
with the larger increase in market share (+36.2%) for non-reputable bailed-out banks 
compared to the decrease in market share (-12.4%) suffered by reputable bailed-out 
banks, as shown in the DID regressions. 
Furthermore, since bank bailouts occur during a period of economic difficulty, the 
firm–bank matching allows us to check that our estimates are not contaminated by other 
confounding events. First, it may be that during the crisis, some firms that are unable to 
obtain loans could increase the demand in issuing corporate bonds for financing purposes 
(Carvalho, Ferreira, & Matos, 2015). In order to avoid potential biases stemming from 
the possibility that the restricted availability of other funding sources led some firms to 
issue corporate bonds during the crisis, we re-estimate our models for a subsample of 
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firms that issued at least one bond in both periods: pre-crisis and crisis. Second, lending 
relationships on the credit market are strong predictors of underwriting relations between 
commercial bank underwriters and firms (Yasuda, 2005), especially in the European 
market. In order to test that changes in market shares are not partly driven by those firms 
that lost their lending relationships because of the crisis, we re-run the regressions for 
firms that did not take out a loan during any of the four years before the bond issuance23. 
Thus, the matching is not potentially affected by the existence of prior lending 
relationships. Columns 2 and 3 of Table IV shows the results, which are fully consistent 
with the baseline estimation.  
6.2. Firm-bank matching: Retaining a prior mandate  
We employ bond-level data to examine the probability of an underwriter retaining 
a prior mandate from a given firm. For each bond k issued by firm i, we consider whether 
the firm has retained the prior underwriter(s). Then, for any given bond issued from 
September 2008 onwards (when the bulk of the recapitalization measures began), the 
choice set includes the bank(s) that underwrote the previous bond issued by the firm in 
question. Our dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the bank is retained as 
underwriter. Consistent with the methodology used in the examination of the firm–bank 
matching, we use a conditional fixed effects logit model to avoid the incidental parameter 
biases of including firm and year fixed effects. As in equation (3), we control for bond, 
firm, bank and prior firm–bank relationships. Moreover, we include firm and year fixed 
effects to control for unobservable firm characteristics and variations in debt financing 
over time, respectively. Then, we estimate the following equation (4): 
                                                          
23 We also consider longer (five-year) and shorter (three-year) time windows in unreported regressions. The results 
remain robust. 
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E(Y |X=x)=Pr(Retained 𝑈𝑊=1| X )= Λ (𝛽0+ 𝛽1 Recapitalized Bank+ 𝛽2 Reputable 
+ 𝛽3 Recapitalized x Reputable + 𝛽4𝑋𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠+ 𝛽5𝑋firm 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 +𝛽6𝑋bank 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠+ 
𝛽7𝑋firm−bank 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑠+  Year FE + Firm FE + 𝑒𝑖 )     (4) 
The regression results are shown in Table V. Taking together the coefficient and 
the statistical significance of Recapitalizedit x Reputablei, we find that reputable banks 
are less likely to be retained as underwriters when they are bailed out. This result suggests 
that reputable banks are more likely to be replaced as underwriters after being bailed out. 
These findings are in line with the hypothesis of a differential effect of ex-ante 
reputational capital. We find that for reputable bailed-out underwriters, the probability of 
retaining a mandate decreases by 26.3%, while this same probability increases by 5% for 
less reputable bailed-out underwriters.  
7. MEASURING REPUTATION 
In order to ensure that reputation is appropriately measured we have considered 
alternative reputation indicators.  
7.1. Continuous measures of reputation 
In order to avoid potential biases introduced by the use of a discrete measure of 
reputation, we use continuous indicators and re-run our models24 Three continuous 
measures of reputation are considered. Firstly, we use each underwriter’s total proceeds 
raised in the corporate bond markets during the pre-bailout period (UW-proceeds). With 
this measure, each underwriter is assigned a reputation based on the dollars it places into 
the bond markets. Moreover, we compute a variable based on the ranking held in the 
league tables (UW-inv.ranking). Specifically, we obtain the multiplicative inverse of the 
pre-bailout ranking position (e.g. if a bank is ranked third, the inverse ranking would be 
                                                          







1/3). This is a continuous variable on the interval [0,1], where scores closer to 1 indicate 
higher reputability. Finally, we also use Megginson and Weiss’ (1991) indicator (UW-
MW) of underwriter reputation. This is a market-share-based continuous variable254 on 
the interval [0,100]. All the reputation measures are strongly positively correlated. Table 
VI reports the results of the regressions employing all the continuous measures. Our main 
results, indicating a differential effect of state aid recapitalization depending on 
underwriter reputation, are confirmed. 
7.2. Alternative measures of reputation 
In order to avoid measurement errors and test the soundness of our results, we also 
employ alternative measures of underwriter reputation. Based on prior theoretical and 
empirical findings on underwriter reputation, we consider two alternative measures of 
reputation. Firstly, we use bonds placed for high-quality firms. Fernando et al. (2005) find 
evidence of a positive assortative selection between firms and underwriters, by which 
high-quality issuers match with reputable underwriters. Dai, Jo and Schatzberg (2010) 
also find a positive assortative matching in private investments in public equity markets 
(PIPE). We then build a reputation measure based on the bonds issued by high-quality 
firms during the pre-bailout period. To compute this measure, we consider the 
underwriters’ market shares among those deals issued by firms that had a high grade or 
prime rating (above A+/A1) when issuing the bond. According to the standards reported 
by the main rating agencies, firms with such ratings are high-quality firms with very low 
credit risk due to their capacity to meet their financial commitments. Ratings at launch 
provided by the three main rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) are 
considered. If the agencies’ ratings differ, we consider a firm high quality if at least two 
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agencies provided a rating above A+/A1. Reputation, based on these high-quality firms’ 
bonds, is computed using discrete and also continuous measures. 
Secondly, we also measure underwriters’ reputation based on the 
accuracy/reputation of their fixed income investment analysts. Investment analysts play 
an important role in capital markets, as they may increase visibility among potential 
investors, reduce information asymmetries, and enhance liquidity (Autore, Kovacs, & 
Sharma, 2009; Barth, Zasznik, & McNichols, 2001; Jiraporn, Chintrakarn, & Kim, 2012). 
Earlier studies have revealed a positive relationship between analyst reputation and 
research quality (Fang & Yasuda, 2014; Fang & Yasuda, 2009; Gleason & Lee, 2003; 
Jackson, 2005). The accuracy of their forecasts allows analysts and their research teams 
to establish a reputation within the industry. Those analysts are known as “star analysts”. 
The presence of star analysts is proxied by the Institutional Investor Awards 
(Abrahamson, Jenkinson, & Jones, 2011; Drucker & Puri, 2005; Fang & Yasuda, 2009; 
Franck & Kerl, 2013). Then, based on the All-Europe Fixed-Income Research Team 
awards, each bank has a reputation level in line with the total number of analysts’ awards 
received during the pre-bailout period. Again, reputation is computed using discrete and 
continuous measures. Table VII reports the results. The baseline findings hold. 
7.3. The reputational cutoff 
In order to provide additional insight into the differential effect of bank bailouts 
depending on banks’ ex-ante reputational capital, we consider some reputational cutoffs. 
Firstly, we re-run the DID regressions, extending the criteria used to define reputation 
(Top 5, Top 10, Top 15, and Top 20), and we plot the coefficient of the interaction 
(Recapitalizedit x Reputablei,). By extending the reputational criteria, some banks that are 
not truly reputable are artificially considered to be reputable. Figure IV.a shows that the 
impact of the negative effect of reputation after a bailout decreases and becomes 
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statistically insignificant. This finding supports the reputational hypothesis, as only the 
most reputable underwriters are likely to suffer a loss in market share.  
Secondly, we re-run our regressions computing the effect of bank bailouts for 
different sub-groups of banks (Top 1–5, Top 5–10, Top 10–15 and Top 15–20). In doing 
so, we are able to test whether the impact of a bank bailout differs according to differences 
in the ex-ante reputational capital of the sub-groups of banks. Figure IV.b plots the results. 
As we expected, the effect of the bailout (negative or positive) depends on the bailed-out 
bank’s ex-ante reputational capital. Reputable banks suffer market shares losses, while 
less reputable banks experience gains 
8. ROBUSTNESS TESTS  
8.1. Alternative market share measures 
A primary concern is ensuring that our results are not driven by how underwriters’ 
market shares are computed when several underwriters place a bond. For robustness 
purposes, we compute as dependent variable market share full proceeds, which is 
calculated by assigning the total amount of the proceeds to each bank in case of syndicated 
bonds. Columns 1 and 2 in Table VIII show the results, which are consistent with the 
main findings reported in Table III. The coefficient of the interaction (Recapitalizedit x 
Reputablei,) remains significantly negative while the coefficient of Recapitalizedit is 
positive and statistically significant.  
8.2 Subsample: Active underwriters 
We are also concerned about the fact that some underwriters placed bonds in some 
but not all years of the research period. In order to ensure that our results are not driven 
by some banks placing bonds at particular moments due to specific isolated mandates, we 
re-estimate our model using a subsample of banks that placed bonds every year from 2006 
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to 2013. The results are shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table VIII and are similar to the 
baseline estimations. 
8.3. Placebo experiments 
Furthermore, as in related studies employing a DID methodology, we conduct 
some placebo experiments. Firstly, underwriters are randomly categorized as 
recapitalized or not recapitalized, and then the model is re-run with bootstrapped 
confidence intervals using 2,500 replications. We conduct a placebo experiment in which 
the timing of the bailout measure is faked. As in previous studies (Berger & Roman, 2017; 
Calderon & Schaeck, 2016; Puddu & Wälchli, 2013), we assume that each of the bailout 
measures took place two years earlier than the real date, while still distinguishing between 
bailed-out and non-bailed-out banks. In both placebo experiments, all the main variables 
are statistically insignificant (Table VIII). 
 8.4. Intensity of government support 
We test the robustness of our results to the intensity of government support by 
using alternative measures of Recapitalization. In particular, we replace the 
Recapitalization dummies with two continuous variables. Recapitalization Intensity is 
computed as the ratio of the total funds received by the underwriter to the underwriter’s 
total assets, while Recapitalization Amount is the natural logarithm of the recapitalization 
amount plus one. As shown in Table VIII, after considering the intensity of the 
recapitalizations, the results regarding their effects remain very similar to the baseline 
findings. 
8.5. Self-selection 
To address the potential self-selection bias arising from being a bailed-out bank, 
we employ a two-stage Heckman selectivity model (Heckman, 1979). Here, we first 
estimate a probit model, regressing the Recapitalized dummy on all control variables from 
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our main specification, as well as on certain determinants discussed in the literature on 
bank recapitalizations (Beccalli & Frantz, 2016; Berger & Bouwman, 2013; Gerhardt & 
Vennet, 2017; Mariathasan & Merrouche, 2012; Papanikolaou, 2018). From this probit 
estimation, we obtain the inverse Mills ratio, which is used as one of the regressors in the 
second-stage equation to produce consistent estimates of underwriters’ market shares. 
Pr(Publicly Recapitalized Underwriter = 1 |X = x) =  Λ (𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 +
 𝛽2𝑋𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟ℎ
ℎ
ℎ=1 + ∑ 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝑒𝑖 )               (4) 
Consistent with prior studies on bank recapitalization, the likelihood of being 
recapitalized is regressed on specific features of underwriters—size, profitability, 
liquidity, capital adequacy, interbank lendings, age and being listed—and country 
features based on the underwriter’s nationality, namely regulatory quality, stock market 
volatility, GDP growth and economic freedom. These variables are described in Table 
A.II Panel E. Table IX shows that large, less profitable and less liquid banks are more 
likely to be recapitalized. Additionally, these recapitalizations occur in countries with low 
GDP growth rates, volatile stock markets, high regulatory quality and a lower index of 
economic freedom. These results are in line with prior findings on public recapitalizations 
of banks (Beccalli & Frantz, 2016; Li, 2013; Mariathasan & Merrouche, 2012).  
The second-stage results, also reported in Table IX, show that our results are not 
biased by sample selection. The inverse Mills ratio is not statistically significant.  
8.6. Instrumental Variable Analysis (IV) 
Due to the potential endogeneity of our Recapitalization variable, we conduct an 
instrumental variable (IV) analysis similar to those employed in earlier bank bailout 
studies (Berger, Makaew, & Roman, 2018; Berger & Roman, 2015, 2017; Calderon & 
Schaeck, 2016; Dam & Koetter, 2012; Duchin & Sosyura, 2014). We consider three 
instruments that have been employed in prior papers dealing with endogeneity concerns 
in bank bailouts. Some earlier studies (Blau, Brough, & Thomas, 2013; Dam & Koetter, 
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2012; Li, 2013; Lim, Hagendorff, & Armitage, 2019) have found that banks’ political and 
regulatory connections affect their probability of being bailed out. We thus use banks’ 
political and regulatory connections (Pol_Reg connection) as an instrument. This variable 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the bank’s chief executive or president has 
previously served as a politician, has been publicly appointed on a discretionary basis by 
the government or any public agency (i.e. Secretary of State, Director General) or has 
served in a financial regulatory/supervisory agency or central bank26. The second 
instrument is based on the importance of the regulatory architecture to the approval of a 
bailout. As in Calderon and Schaeck (2016), we use the prompt corrective power index 
built from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey in Barth, Caprio and Levine 
(2013). This index ranges from 0 to 6 and proxies whether there are predetermined levels 
of bank solvency deterioration that force automatic actions such as interventions. Third, 
we use a variable that captures the level of bank opacity. As argued by Flannery, Kwan 
and Nimalendran (2013), government interventions during the 2007–2009 crisis were 
predicated on spikes in information asymmetries because of bank opaqueness. Bank 
opacity is computed as the ratio of available for sale (AFS) securities to total securities. 
Econometrically, because the potentially endogenous explanatory variable is 
binary, we employ a dummy endogenous variable model (Wooldridge, 2002). For the 
first stage, we use a probit model that regresses a discrete dummy for recapitalized banks 
on the instruments and all control variables of our baseline regression model. 
Subsequently, we use the predicted probability obtained from the first stage as an 
instrument for the second stage. The results are reported in Table X. Panel A presents the 
first-stage regression, and the second-stage results are shown in Panel B. The weak 
                                                          
26 The information to build this variable was retrieved from a number of sources: CRP’s Revolving Door database, 
RevolvingDoorWatch, Orbis BankFocus, LinkedIn, official public administration sources and the webpages of central 
banks and regulatory agencies 
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instruments hypothesis can be rejected according to the first-stage F-tests and 
Kleibergen–Paap identification tests. All three instruments employed are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign. In the second-stage regression, we find that the 
main results hold. 
8.7. Alternative econometric specifications 
8.7.1. Classical Difference-in-Difference 
While the main methodological approach employed in the paper is a generalized 
DID that addresses the fact that some banks were recapitalized repeatedly during the 
sample period, we also employ a simple DID approach. In particular, we use the Berger 
et al. (2018, 2019) and Berger and Roman (2015, 2017) specification as follows: 
𝑀𝑘𝑡. 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖
+  𝛽4 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡  𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡  𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡  𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 +   𝛽7𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    
(5) 
As we aim to examine the differences between bailed-out vs. non-bailed-out 
banks, reputable vs. non-reputable banks, and pre- vs. post-bailout periods (triple 
differences), in equation (5) we employ a specification with six betas (β1- β6) plus time 
fixed effects to capture all eight scenarios (2x2x2). The post-bailout dummy is not 
included, since it is implicitly captured by the time fixed effects. The dependent variable 
is the market share of underwriter i in year t. Recapitalizedi is a dummy that takes the 
value 1 for the bailed-out banks (treated group). Post − Bailoutt  is a dummy equal to 1 
in 2009:Q1–2013:Q4 (as in Berger et al., 2018, 2019; Berger & Roman, 2015, 2017, 
Duchin & Sosyura, 2014)27. Consistent with the DID approach, those banks that received 
a first state capital injection after the treatment period ending in December 2010 are 
                                                          
27 As in Berger, Makaew, & Roman (2018) and Berger & Roman (2015), the Post-Bailout dummy does not appear by 
itself on the right-hand side of the equation, because it would be collinear with the time fixed effects. 
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excluded28. The standard errors reported are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at 
the underwriter level. 
The regression results, reported in Table XI, are qualitatively similar to those 
obtained in the main regressions. 
 8.7.2. Matched differences-in-differences 
For robustness purposes, we also employ Gormley and Matsa's (2011, 2016) 
matched differences-in-differences estimator as an alternative approach to deal with 
multiple treatment events occurring at different times. This requires building a sample of 
banks for each year that a bailout measure is implemented. In this sample, bailed-out 
banks are considered as treated, while non-bailed-out banks are considered as control. For 
each such cohort sample, we analyze firm–year observations before and after the 
implementation of the bailout measure. We then pool the samples into one dataset, 
creating a variable that identifies the cohort to which each observation belongs, and we 
estimate the average effect. Table XII shows the results for the matched differences-in-
differences estimator. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained in the main 
regressions. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
 Underwriting has become a substantial revenue-generation source for banks. This 
growth of the underwriting business occurred at around the time of the financial crisis, 
when some of these banks had to be bailed out. In this paper, we explored the effects of 
these public capital infusions on the underwriting business. An investigation of the effects 
of state aid recapitalization measures is relevant, since according to the certification-
                                                          
28 Five banks were removed: Abanka Vipa, Banco BPI, Banco Grupo Cajatres, Millenium Investment Banking and 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka. 
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reputational hypothesis, the information disclosed about beneficiaries may affect their 
future business. 
  Our research contributes to the extant literature on bank bailouts by indicating that 
bailout programs may have unintended effects not only on lending but also on banks’ 
alternative businesses. Additionally, this paper contributes to the underwriting literature 
by exploring how certification-reputational concerns may affect underwriters’ market 
shares after they have been publicly recapitalized. In doing so, along with the usual 
variables regarding banks’ financial strength, we included a number of quantitative and 
qualitative drivers of underwriters’ market shares. Furthermore, we did not focus on a 
specific bailout program, but on all the bailouts that may have affected the businesses of 
the underwriters competing in the European bond market. 
Using a DID approach, we found that reputable underwriters suffered losses in 
underwriting market share after being state-aid-recapitalized, while state aid 
recapitalization increased the market shares of non-reputable underwriters. These results 
are found to be economically significant. The findings are consistent with the 
certification-reputational hypothesis for those banks with a large ex-ante reputational 
capital. Finally, we showed that the differential effect of ex-ante reputational capital is 
confirmed in a firm-bank matching analysis.  
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TABLE I 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE UNDERWRITING EUROPEAN CORPORATE BOND MARKET 
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Active Underwriters 38 41 48 58 62 63 74 94 
Total nº of bonds  119 113 131 242 235 235 375 397 
Total proceeds raised (mill.$) 81181.55 88297.53 88195.37 238553.97 144511.97 149058.70 242770.41 236520.71 
Average UW mkt. share  2.69 2.50 2.17 1.81 1.69 1.67 1.41 1.10 
Median UW mkt. share  0.64 1.67 0.53 0.35 0.60 0.54 0.24 0.19 
HHI (UW)  0.0684 0.0599 0.0762 0.0601 0.0500 0.0486 0.0443 0.0417 
Average Lending mkt. share 1.74 1.78 1.52 1.32 1.23 1.30 1.09 0.87 
Median Lending mkt. share 1.30 1.19 1.07 0.63 0.68 0.71 0.55 0.29 
 
TABLE II 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE MAIN VARIABLES 
      
Non 
Bailed-out Bailed-out  
 mean p50 p25 p75 sd mean 
Market Share 0.88 0.01 0.00 0.45 1.99 0.52 1.94 
Determinants of Uws market share        
Abnormal Bond Spreads 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.01 
Abnormal Fees 27.67 0.00 0.00 28.12 91.60 24.80 35.94 
HHI Industrial Specialization 3239.71 1383.80 0.00 5381.45 3796.44 3379.00 2837.60 
Nº Total Star Analyst (%) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 
UW Lender 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.11 0.36 
Lending Mktshare 0.74 0.17 0.00 0.99 1.22 0.48 1.48 
Private Placement 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.04 
Multiple Uws 0.56 0.89 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.49 0.75 
Determinants of underwriters’ financial health        
UW size 12.09 12.80 11.27 13.66 2.27 11.64 13.25 
ROE 5.60 9.49 4.04 14.99 39.94 9.80 -5.12 
Liquidity 57.09 36.50 21.21 61.78 81.47 59.37 51.50 
Capital Adequacy 14.72 6.18 4.41 8.66 69.29 18.25 5.68 
Operation Efficiency 66.73 60.89 51.25 71.06 38.48 64.49 72.58 
Age 1.54 2.05 0.00 2.96 1.45 1.33 2.14 
Listed 0.74 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.74 0.75 




DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES REGRESSIONS ON UNDERWRITER MARKET SHARES 
This table presents the coefficients for the difference-in-differences estimations for underwriter market shares for fixed corporate 
bonds in Europe from 2006–2013. The dependent variable is underwriter market share computed on a proceeds base, in which 
proceeds of syndicated bonds are split among all the underwriters. Column I and II presents the results for Equation 1. Column III 
and IV present the results for Equation 2. All the explanatory variables are described in the Appendix Table A.II. A constant term 
(not reported) is included in all regressions. Z-statistics are based on underwriter clustered standard errors. *, **, *** Coefficients 
are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10 %, 5% and 1% levels. 
Dependent Variable:  
Mkt. share Proceeds 
Apportioned 
Equation 1 Equation 2  
Reputable: Top 5 
     
Recapitalizedit 0.00407 0.0734 0.107* 0.199** 
 (0.116) (0.119) (0.0640) (0.121) 
Recapitalizedit x Reputablei   -1.324** -1.204*** 
   (0.385) (0.356) 
Abnormal Bond Spreads  0.000189  0.000250 
  (0.000373)  (0.000365) 
Abnormal Fees  0.179  0.0172 
  (0.373)  (0.366) 
HHI Industry Specialization  -4.07e-05***  6.41e-06 
  (1.29e-05)  (1.60e-05) 
Number Total Star Analyst i,t-1  0.0737***  0.0542** 
  (0.0245)  (0.0244) 
UW Lender i,t  0.498***  0.396*** 
  (0.112)  (0.111) 
Lending Mktshare i,t  0.00585  0.00529 
  (0.0122)  (0.0119) 
Private Placement  0.230  -0.127 
  (0.328)  (0.328) 
Multiple Uws  0.396***  -0.0232 
  (0.131)  (0.153) 
UW size  0.481***  0.452*** 
  (0.149)  (0.146) 
ROE  -0.000530  -0.000378 
  (0.000957)  (0.000936) 
Liquidity  -0.000827  -0.00105 
  (0.000754)  (0.000739) 
Capital Adequacy  0.0239  0.0276* 
  (0.0163)  (0.0159) 
Operation Efficiency  0.000106  0.000215 
  (0.000999)  (0.000977) 
Age  1.98e-05  0.00990 
  (0.0684)  (0.0670) 
Listed  -0.00491  -0.0146 
  (0.316)  (0.309) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UW Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 833 833 833 833 






TABLE IV  
FIRM-BANK MATCHING: WINNING A MANDATE 
This table presents the coefficients and the z-statistics for the conditional fixed effects logit regressions for the determinants of being chosen as 
underwriter in a given deal. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Z-statistics are based on bond clustered standard errors. A constant term (not 
reported) is included in all regressions. *, **, *** Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10 %, 5% and 1%. 





Subsample: Firms issuing 
in the pre-crisis & crisis  
Subsample: Firms without 
prior lending relationships 
 Recapitalizedit 0.139** 0.165** 0.236*** 
 (0.0569) (0.0714) (0.0800) 
Reputablei 0.348*** 0.461*** 0.686*** 
 (0.0767) (0.0929) (0.116) 
Recapitalizedit x Reputablei -0.175** -0.207** -0.339** 














Bond size 0.109** 0.122*** 0.129** 
 (0.0428) (0.0318) (0.0613) 
Maturity 0.0264 0.0223 0.00402 
 (0.0278) (0.0165) (0.0804) 
Callability 0.0348 0.0266 0.0940 
 (0.0660) (0.106) (0.109) 
Domestic Placement -0.164* -0.117 -0.360 
 (0.0894) (0.0898) (0.484) 
Investment Grade 0.176 0.0821 -0.0108 
 (0.273) (0.307) (0.223) 
Collateral 0.0463 0.180* 0.175* 
 (0.215) (0.109) (0.113) 
Syndicate Size 0.278*** 0.275*** 0.248*** 














Firm size 0.120 0.0536 0.177 
 (5.666) (5.403) (0.595) 
Firm Leverage 0.0280 0.334 0.0513 
 (3.264) (4.674) (0.963) 
Firm ROA 0.00105 0.00408 -0.0122 
 (0.0145) (0.0345) (0.0182) 
First time issuer 0.111* 0.0128 0.194 














Abnormal Bond Spreads -0.00186*** -0.00204** -0.00356*** 
 (0.000689) (0.000802) (0.00111) 
Abnormal Fees -0.101 -0.486 0.839* 
 (0.414) (0.616) (0.433) 
HHI Industry Specialization -0.000158*** -0.000115*** -9.89e-05*** 
 (3.03e-05) (4.00e-05) (2.23e-05) 
Number Total Star Analyst (%) i,t-1 0.708 -0.225 0.0897 
 (0.895) (1.263) (0.578) 
UW Lender i,t 0.287*** 0.276*** 0.232** 
 (0.0691) (0.0793) (0.0909) 
Lending Mktshare i,t 0.0564 0.0173 0.00949 
 (0.0706) (0.0905) (0.0346) 
Private Placement 1.364*** 1.006*** 0.675 
 (0.219) (0.280) (0.461) 
Multiple Uws -0.777*** -0.811** -1.477*** 
 (0.253) (0.333) (0.237) 
UW size 0.489* 0.709* 0.467*** 
 (0.292) (0.426) (0.0615) 
ROE 0.00102 0.00657*** 0.00239 
 (0.000681) (0.00253) (0.00166) 
Liquidity 0.00183*** 0.00236*** 0.00273*** 
 (0.000326) (0.000406) (0.000403) 
Capital Adequacy 0.00462 0.00601 0.00596*** 
 (0.00300) (0.00460) (0.000970) 
Operation Efficiency 0.00170* 0.00203 0.00354** 
 (0.000972) (0.00149) (0.00144) 
Age 0.371*** 0.395*** 0.366*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0548) (0.0631) 
Listed 0.624*** 0.633*** 0.944*** 






















Firm – Bank Shared nationality 1.581*** 1.321*** 1.648*** 
 (0.0748) (0.0925) (0.0782) 
Prior Firm-UW Relationships 2.220*** 2.311*** 4.140*** 
 (0.339) (0.440) (0.355) 
Prior Firm-Lending Relationships 9.507*** 6.180***  
 (0.859) (0.796)  
 Observations 100,188 57,221 29,741 
 Year Yes Yes Yes 
 Firm Yes Yes Yes 
 Pseudo R2 0.310 0.279 0.243 
 Log-Likelihood -13806.3 -8692.5  -3932.1 
 p-value (chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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TABLE V 
FIRM-BANK MATCHING: RETAINING A PRIOR MANDATE 
This table presents the coefficients and the z-statistics for the conditional fixed effects logit regressions for the determinants of being retained 
as underwriter in a given deal. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Z-statistics are based on bond clustered standard errors. A constant 
term (not reported) is included in all regressions. *, **, *** Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 VARIABLES Dep. Var: UW Retained ( 0 | 1)                 
  Firm-Bank Matching: 
Retention 
Subsample: Firms issuing in 
the pre-crisis & crisis 
Subsample: Firms without 
prior lending relationships 
 Recapitalizedit -0.0585 -0.0627 0.195 
 (0.166) (0.239) (0.329) 
Reputablei 0.414** 0.552** 0.561* 
 (0.183) (0.229) (0.329) 
Recapitalizedit x Reputablei -0.539** -0.579** -0.947** 














Bond size -0.386*** -0.309** 0.0955 
 (0.129) (0.143) (0.245) 
Maturity 0.134 0.313 0.751* 
 (0.179) (0.215) (0.408) 
Callability 0.309 0.184 1.116** 
 (0.197) (0.255) (0.568) 
Domestic Placement 0.120 0.0781 12.46*** 
 (0.345) (0.463) (1.195) 
Investment Grade -0.751 -0.540 -0.906 
 (0.583) (0.709) (0.772) 
Collateral 1.532 -11.22*** -4.315 
 (1.024) (1.155) (3.541) 
Syndicate Size 0.385*** 0.380*** 0.291*** 














Firm size -1.932** -1.381 -4.565** 
 (0.844) (1.119) (2.027) 
Firm Leverage -1.142 1.810 5.844 
 (2.231) (2.497) (5.927) 
Firm ROA 0.00319 0.0303 0.0525 
 (0.0257) (0.0295) (0.0491) 
First time issuer 0.426 0.0209 0.153 














Abnormal Bond Spreads -0.000850 -0.00165 0.00125 
 (0.00209) (0.00277) (0.00418) 
Abnormal Fees -1.139 -1.566 -0.211 
 (1.168) (1.458) (2.206) 
HHI Industry Specialization -1.89e-05 4.38e-06 -0.000130 
 (6.05e-05) (7.40e-05) (0.000111) 
Number Total Star Analyst i,t-1 0.0182 0.0331* 0.0315 
 (0.0129) (0.0171) (0.0305) 
UW Lender i,t 0.188 -0.0186 -0.0674 
 (0.187) (0.217) (0.303) 
Lending Mktshare i,t 0.117 0.154 0.0365 
 (0.0710) (0.0992) (0.172) 
Private Placement -2.149** -0.939 -3.341* 
 (1.087) (1.452) (1.866) 
Multiple Uws -1.919*** -3.012*** -1.058 
 (0.594) (0.635) (1.236) 
UW size 0.0170 -0.0358 0.115 
 (0.0834) (0.139) (0.371) 
ROE -0.000132 -0.0188*** -0.00854 
 (0.00205) (0.00713) (0.0106) 
Liquidity 0.00267*** 0.00299** 0.0127* 
 (0.00102) (0.00132) (0.00748) 
Capital Adequacy 0.0524* 0.0177 0.0402 
 (0.0288) (0.0433) (0.0677) 
Operation Efficiency -0.00227 -0.00635** -0.00651 
 (0.00224) (0.00322) (0.00466) 
Age -0.0813 0.439** 0.369 
 (0.157) (0.208) (0.387) 
Listed 0.932** 1.259** 0.457 
















 Firm – Bank Shared nationality 0.869*** 0.883*** 0.773*** 
 (0.138) (0.185) (0.295) 
Prior Firm-UW Relationships 0.604 0.211 1.955 
 (0.524) (0.687) (1.199) 
Prior Firm-Lending Relationships 2.222*** 0.949  
 (0.856) (0.723)  
 
Observations 2,938 1,917 726 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 Pseudo R2 0.113 0.123 0.156 
 Log-Likelihood -1092.8 -710.6 -263.8 
 p-value (chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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TABLE VI 
CONTINUOUS MEASURES OF REPUTATION 
This table presents the coefficients for the difference-in-differences estimations for underwriter market shares for fixed corporate bonds 
in Europe from 2006–2013. The dependent variable is underwriter market share computed on a proceeds base, in which proceeds of 
syndicated bonds are split among all the underwriters. In Column I, the total proceeds raised in the corporate bond markets by each 
underwriter during the pre-bailout period (UW-proceeds) are considered as reputation measure. In Column II, the inverse of the raking 
position hold by the underwriter in the league tables during the pre-bailout period (UW-inv.ranking) is used as reputation measure. In 
Column III, the Megginson–Weiss measure computed during the pre-bailout period is used as reputation measure. A constant term (not 
reported) is included in all regressions. Z-statistics are based on underwriter clustered standard errors. *, **, *** Coefficients are 
statistically significant different than zero at least at 10 %, 5% and 1% levels. 
Dependent Variable:  
Mkt. share Proceeds Apportioned 
Continuous reputation measure 
UW-proceeds UW-inv.ranking UW-MW 
    
Recapitalizedit 0.236* 0.606*** 1.464** 
 (0.133) (0.129) (0.683) 
Recapitalizedit x Reputation measurei -0.112*** -8.667*** -0.0177** 
 (0.0407) (0.998) (0.00840) 
    
Controls  Yes  Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes 
UW Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes Yes 
F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 833 833 833 
R-squared 0.321 0.228 0.222 
 
TABLE VII 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF REPUTATION 
This table presents the coefficients for the difference-in-differences estimations for underwriter market shares for fixed corporate bonds in 
Europe from 2006–2013. The dependent variable is underwriter market share computed on a proceeds base, in which proceeds of syndicated 
bonds are split among all the underwriters. Panel A measures reputation based on deals issued by high-quality firms. Panel B measures 
reputation based on the presence of star fixed income analysts working for the underwriter. All the discrete and continuous measures considered 
in each regression are described in the Appendix Table A.II. A constant term (not reported) is included in all regressions. Z-statistics are based 
on underwriter clustered standard errors. *, **, *** Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10 %, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
Panel A. Alt. Reputation measure: High Quality firms 
Dependent Variable:  
Mkt. share Proceeds Apportioned 
 Continuous measures 
Top 5 UW-proceeds UW-inv. ranking UW-MW 
     
Recapitalizedit 0.263** 0.449*** 0.724*** 0.305** 
 (0.116) (0.122) (0.132) (0.133) 
Recapitalizedit x Reputation measurei -3.473*** -5.76e-10*** -9.758*** -0.0102*** 
 (0.415) (6.59e-11) (1.040) (0.00238) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UW Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 833 833 833 833 
R-squared 0.270 0.572 0.240 0.178 
Panel B. Alt. Reputation measure: Fixed-Income Star Analysts 
Dependent Variable:  
Mkt. share Proceeds Apportioned 
 Continuous measures 
Top 5 Nº Star Analysts Inv. ranking MW 
     
Recapitalizedit 0.109* 0.220** 0.342** 0.223** 
 (0.101) (0.069) (0.136) (0.067) 
Recapitalizedit x Reputation measurei -1.256*** -0.0268*** -2.768*** -0.0108*** 
 (0.437) (0.00634) (0.633) (0.00329) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UW Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 833 833 833 833 
R-squared 0.293 0.245 0.263 0.243 
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FIGURE IV. 
THE REPUTATIONAL CUTOFF 
These figures plot the coefficients for difference-in-difference regressions. Figure IV.a (left-hand side) plots the DID coefficients extending the criteria used to be defined as reputable 


















ROBUSTNESS CHECKS IN DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES REGRESSIONS ON UNDERWRITER MARKET SHARES 
This table presents the coefficients for the difference-in-differences estimations for underwriter market shares for fixed corporate bonds in Europe from 2006–2013. Column I and II present the results using alternative 
market share measures. Column III and IV present the results for a subsample of active underwriters placing at least one bond per year. Columns V to VIII present the results using alternative reputation measures. In 
Column V and VI underwriters are randomly assigned as recapitalized or not and errors are obtained with bootstrapped confidence intervals using 2,500 replications. In Columns VII and VIII, it is artificially assumed 
that each of the bailout measures took place two years earlier. In Columns IX and X the recapitalization measure used is the ratio of total funds received by the underwriter to total assets. In Columns XI and XII the 
recapitalization measure used is the natural logarithm of the total funds received by the underwriter plus one. The reputation measure considered is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the underwriter if the underwriter 
bank is ranked in the top five in the annual league tables considering the market shares of the pre-bailout period A constant term (not reported) is included in all regressions. Z-statistics are based on underwriter 






Placebo Experiments Intensity of the Recapitalization Measure 
 
Dep. Var: Dep. Var: 
Dep. Var: Mkt. share 
Proceeds Apportioned 
Dep. Var: Mkt. share Proceeds Apportioned Dep. Var: Mkt. share Proceeds Apportioned 
 Dependent Variable:  
Mkt. share proceeds full Nº deals >0 









Recapitalized = Recapitalization 
amount 
Ln (1+ Recapitalization 
amount) 
Recapitalizedit 0.0771 0.218* 0.362 0.613** -0.00794 -0.00632 -0.00594 -0.0723 1.113 1.925* 0.0222 0.0292**  
(0.122) (0.123) (0.269) (0.282) (0.0635) (0.0652) (0.133) (0.167) (1.465) (1.449) (0.0138) (0.0141) 
Recapitalizedit x Reputablei  -1.360***  -1.404***  -0.0319  1.207  -31.08**  -0.0612** 
  (0.363)  (0.529)  (0.290)  (1.464)  (14.48)  (0.0355) 
             





         
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UW Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 833 833 436 436 794 833 833 833 833 833 833 833 
R-squared 0.444 0.454 0.285 0.261 0.399 0.399 0.453 0.493 0.514 0.492 0.513 0.510 
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TABLE IX 
ROBUSTNESS: TWO-STAGE HECKMAN’S MODEL FOR SELF-SELECTION BIASES  
This table presents the coefficients for the two-stage Heckman’s (1979) self-selection model. In the first stage the dependent variable is a dummy 
that takes the value 1 if the underwriter is being recapitalized. In the second stage the dependent variable is underwriter market share computed 
on a proceeds base, in which proceeds of syndicated bonds are split among all the underwriters. All the explanatory variables are described in 
the Appendix. A constant term (not reported) is included in all regressions. Z-statistics are based on underwriter clustered standard errors.*, **, 
*** Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10 %, 5% and 1% levels. 
First Stage (Probit) Second Stage  
Dependent Var.: Recapitalized UW Dependent Var.: Mkt. share Proc. App Eq. 1  Eq. 2  Reputable: Top 5 
        








Liquidity -0.0196*** Inverse Mills Ratio -0.104 -0.0900 
 (0.00579)  (0.0967) (0.0956) 
Capital Adequacy -0.0509    
 (0.0524)    
Operation Efficiency 0.00468 Controls Yes Yes 
 (0.00296)    
Age -0.0776    
 (0.148)    
Listed -0.531    
 (0.433)    
Interbank Lendings -1.379    
 (2.189)    
Regulatory Quality 1.596**    
 (0.646)    
Stock Markets Volatility 1.222***    
 (0.383)    
GDP Growth -0.133**    
 (0.0531)    
Economic Freedom -0.149***    
 (0.0477)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes UW Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
F-test 0.00 F-test 0.00 0.00 
Observations 755 Observations 685 685 
Pseudo R2  0.441 R-squared 0.280 0.329 
 
TABLE X 
ROBUSTNESS: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS 
This table presents the coefficients for the difference-in-differences estimations for underwriter market shares for fixed corporate bonds in Europe 
from 2006–2013 using an IV approach. The dependent variable is underwriter market share computed on a proceeds base, in which proceeds of 
syndicated bonds are split among all the underwriters. We use as instruments: Pol_Reg connection, Prompt corrective power index and Bank 
opacity. Panel A reports first-stage results. Panel B reports second-stage regression estimates. All the instruments are described in the Appendix. 
A constant term (not reported) is included in all regressions. Z-statistics are based on underwriter clustered standard errors. *, **, *** Coefficients 
are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10 %, 5% and 1% levels. 
Panel A. Instrumental Variable Estimator First Stage: Instruments 
Dependent Variable: Recapitalized Underwriter  
Pol_Reg connection 1.909*** 
 (0.1573) 
Prompt corrective power index  -0.058*** 
 (0.0271) 
Bank opacity -0.586** 
 (0.3125) 
Controls Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
First-stage F-test (instruments) 20.05 
Kleibergen–Paap weak identification F-statistic  20.17 
Observations 833 
Pseudo R-squared 0.415 
Panel B. Instrumental Variable Estimator Second Stage 
Dependent Variable: Mkt. share Proceeds App.  Top 5 
Recapitalizedit 0.433** 
 (0.167) 
Recapitalizedit x Reputation measurei -1.837*** 
 (0.473) 
Controls Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 







ROBUSTNESS: CLASSICAL DID APPROACH (TRIPLE DIFFERENCES)  
This table presents the coefficients for the difference-in-differences estimations for underwriter market shares for fixed corporate bonds 
in Europe from 2006–2013. The dependent variable is underwriter market share computed on a proceeds base, in which proceeds of 
syndicated bonds are split among all the underwriters. Post-Bailoutt x Recapitalizedi x Reputablei reflects the incremental effect on 
reputable underwriters. Z-statistics are based on underwriter clustered standard errors. A constant term (not reported) is included in all 
regressions. *, **, *** Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10 %, 5% and 1% levels. 
 Dependent Variable: Mkt. share Proceeds Apportioned  
Equation 2  
Reputable: Top 5 
      
Recapitalizedi  -0.505** 
  (0.208) 
Reputablei  3.210** 
  249) 
Reputablei x Recapitalizedi  0.179 
  (0.740) 
Post-Bailoutt x Reputablei  -0.415 
  (1.199) 
Post-Bailoutt x Recapitalizedi  0.416** 
  (0.166) 
Post-Bailoutt x Recapitalizedi x Reputablei  -2.224** 
  (1.144) 
Controls  Yes 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes 
F-test  0.000 
Observations  794 
R-squared                   0.848 
 
TABLE XII 
ROBUSTNESS: MATCHED DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES 
This table presents the coefficients for the matched differences-in-differences estimations for underwriter market shares for fixed corporate 
bonds in Europe from 2006–2013. The dependent variable is underwriter market share computed on a proceeds base, in which proceeds 
of syndicated bonds are split among all the underwriters. Z-statistics are based on underwriter clustered standard errors. A constant term 
(not reported) is included in all regressions. *, **, *** Coefficients are statistically significant different than zero at least at 10 %, 5% and 
1% levels. 
 Dependent Variable: Mkt. share Proceeds Apportioned  
Equation 2  
Reputable: Top 5 
      
Recapitalizedit  0.243*** 
  (0.053) 
Recapitalizedit x Reputablei  -0.446*** 
  (0.1539)    
Controls  Yes 
Time-cohort period fixed effects  Yes 
UW-cohort fixed effects  Yes 
F-test  0.000 
Observations  4,757 




















NATIONAL RANKING LEAGUE TABLES BY MARKET SHARE (< 1% Mkt. share) 
Underwriter France Germany 
United 
Kingdom Italy Spain Europe 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 2.1024 0.2166 1.3119 0.3456 0.4112 0.9467 
RBC Capital Markets 0.8896 1.3463 1.1737 0.0000 0.0000 0.8117 
Mizuho 0.6067 0.5094 1.5551 0.0920 0.0000 0.6872 
LBBW 0.0000 2.7201 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6038 
SEB 0.0000 0.3290 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5681 
Nordea Markets 0.0000 0.1655 0.1047 0.0000 0.0000 0.5363 
BayernLB 0.1319 2.1514 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5071 
Danske Bank 0.0000 0.6159 0.0647 0.0000 0.0000 0.4723 
Merrill Lynch 0.5308 0.1725 0.2745 0.2943 0.0000 0.4213 
DZ Bank 0.0000 1.4491 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3761 
TD Securities Inc 0.4086 0.6763 0.2060 0.0000 0.0000 0.3447 
KBC 0.0616 0.0031 0.0336 0.0000 0.0000 0.3440 
ABN AMRO 0.5929 0.0752 0.2039 0.3370 0.0000 0.3425 
Erste Group Bank AG 0.0000 0.0701 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3302 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG 0.0000 0.1882 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3220 
Mediobanca 0.1639 0.1093 0.0000 3.4205 0.0000 0.3048 
Lehman Brothers 0.0000 0.0000 0.9430 0.0000 0.0000 0.2437 
Bank of America 0.0000 0.1000 0.5177 0.0000 1.1915 0.2335 
Standard Chartered Bank 0.0382 0.1756 0.6528 0.0000 0.0000 0.2132 
Rabobank 0.0535 0.0464 0.0000 0.0522 0.0000 0.1994 
CaixaBank 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.3595 0.1511 
Nomura 0.0431 0.1624 0.1177 0.2199 0.2915 0.1459 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 0.0000 0.0433 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1412 
Belfius Bank & Insurance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1367 
Fortis 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1316 
OP-Pohjola Group 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1231 
CM-CIC 0.5484 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1228 
Dresdner Kleinwort 0.3122 0.2255 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1200 
Caja Madrid - Bankia 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.4035 0.1136 
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 0.2888 0.1481 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1115 
Close Brothers Group plc 0.0000 0.4713 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1090 
KKR 0.0822 0.0922 0.0312 0.0000 0.2915 0.1021 
WestLB 0.0000 0.4158 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0979 
CaixaBI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3986 0.0856 
Wells Fargo Securities 0.0000 0.0338 0.3041 0.0000 0.0000 0.0847 
Monte dei Paschi 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.4594 0.0000 0.0805 
Jefferies LLC 0.0000 0.2075 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0777 
Helaba 0.0000 0.3095 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0687 
Pareto Securities 0.0000 0.0000 0.1490 0.0000 0.0000 0.0687 
ANZ 0.0199 0.0367 0.1831 0.0000 0.0000 0.0591 
Swedbank 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0487 
Centrobanca SpA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8555 0.0000 0.0472 
Banco Espirito Santo 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3986 0.0442 
Canaccord Genuity Corp 0.0000 0.0000 0.1602 0.0000 0.0000 0.0407 
Daiwa Securities 0.1351 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0316 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 0.0265 0.0000 0.0983 0.0000 0.0000 0.0309 
Dexia 0.0995 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0281 
Scotiabank 0.0000 0.0000 0.0554 0.0000 0.0000 0.0280 
National Australia Bank 0.0000 0.0063 0.0926 0.0000 0.0000 0.0249 
Millennium Investment Banking 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0239 
Banco BPI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0232 
DNB Markets 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0227 
CIBC World Markets 0.0194 0.0270 0.0477 0.0000 0.0000 0.0224 
Oddo & Cie 0.0996 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0223 
Banca March SA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7833 0.0217 
TradeRisks Ltd 0.0000 0.0000 0.0805 0.0000 0.0000 0.0204 
Banca Akros 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3689 0.0000 0.0203 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank 0.0000 0.0459 0.0000 0.1690 0.0000 0.0195 














Alpha Bank AE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0183 
Eurobank Ergasias SA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0183 
Industrial & Com. Bank of China- ICBC 0.0606 0.0000 0.0162 0.0000 0.0000 0.0177 
Bank of China 0.0382 0.0218 0.0162 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 
Macquarie Group 0.0000 0.0000 0.0579 0.0000 0.0000 0.0147 
BMO Capital Markets 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0146 
DBS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0140 
Raiffeisenlandesbank Oberoesterreich 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0122 
National Bank of Greece 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0110 
Quirin Bank AG 0.0000 0.0486 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0108 
Petercam 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0108 
Steubing AG 0.0000 0.0202 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0101 
Investec Bank 0.0000 0.0000 0.0375 0.0000 0.0000 0.0095 
Westpac 0.0000 0.0425 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0094 
APG Algemene Pensioen Groep NV 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0083 
Itau BBA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2766 0.0077 
Cecabank SA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2677 0.0074 
Banco de Sabadell SA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2559 0.0071 
Astrup Fearnley AS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0068 
GMP Capital Inc 0.0000 0.0000 0.0248 0.0000 0.0000 0.0063 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0059 
Banco Popular Espanol SA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2025 0.0056 
Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0054 
China Construction Bank Corp - CCB 0.0000 0.0201 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0045 
Zuercher Kantonalbank - ZKB 0.0000 0.0193 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0043 
Renta 4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1330 0.0037 
MM Warburg 0.0000 0.0165 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0037 
Bankinter 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1288 0.0036 
Abanka Vipa 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 
Vontobel 0.0000 0.0125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0028 
Privatbanka as 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0025 
Ahorro Corporacion Financiera SA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0871 0.0024 
Banco Caminos SA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0871 0.0024 
Banco Grupo Cajatres SA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0871 0.0024 
Sociedad General de Valores y Cambios 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0871 0.0024 
Privredna Banka Zagreb 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0016 
National Bank Financial 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 
EuroLand Finance SA 0.0028 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 
Parex Banka 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 
H0 : µcountry = µEurope                    t-values: -2.30 0.5511 -1.64 -1.03 -1.0310  
       
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 686.628 622.920 639.836 702.265 558.544 477.218 
Syndicate size 3.506 3.214 3.156 4.390 4.508 3.185 
Domestic Bonds (%) 2.64% 1.84% 0.38% 7.14% 5.44% 3.66% 
Domestic Underwriters 7 11 7 6 14 - 
U.S Underwriters 8 12 11 6 7 13 
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TABLE A.II.  
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
Panel A. Main Variables 
Variable Description 
Mkt. share / Mkt.share proc. 
App. 
Market share computed on annual proceeds raised in the corporate bond markets (in case of more underwriters 
all the proceeds are equally split among all the underwriters). 
Recapitalizedit Dummy that takes the value 1 when and after a underwriter 𝑖 receives public capital injection at year 𝑡, 0 
otherwise 
Reputablei Dummy that takes the value 1 if the underwriter if the underwriter bank is ranked in the top five in the annual 
league tables considering the market shares of the pre-bailout period, 2006-Sept. 2008. 
Continuous reputation measures 
UW-proceeds Reputation measure computed as each underwriter’s total proceeds raised in the corporate bond markets during 
the pre-bailout. 
UW-inv.ranking Reputation measure computed as the multiplicative inverse of the pre-bailout ranking position hold by an 





Reputation measure computed as  






Alternative reputation measures 
Reputablei  HQ-firms Dummy that takes the value 1 if the underwriter bank is ranked in the top five considering only those bonds 
issued by firms with a high grade or prime rating (above A+/A1) at launch during the pre-bailout period 
Reputablei  FI Star Analysts Dummy that takes the value 1 if the underwriter bank is ranked in the top five awarded banks based on the All-
Europe Fixed-Income Research Team awards (reported by Institutional Investor ) during the pre-bailout period  
Instruments 
Pol_Reg connection 
Dummy variable that equals one if the bank’s chief executive (CEO) or president has previously served as a 
politician, has been publicly appointed on a discretionary basis by the government or any public agency (i.e. 
Secretary of State, Director General) or has served in a financial regulatory/supervisory agency or central bank. 
Prompt corrective power index 
Index that ranges from 0 to 6 according to the regulation levels of bank solvency deterioration that force 
automatic actions, such as interventions. Built following Barth et al. (2013) from the Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey.  
Bank opacity Ratio of available for sale (AFS) securities to total securities 
Classical DID variables 
Recapitalizedi Dummy that takes the value 1 if the underwriter bank has been being recipient of a state capital injection. 
Post-Bailout Periodt Dummy that takes the value 1 in 2009:Q1-2013:Q4 (following Berger et al., 2018, 2019; Berger & Roman, 
2015, 2017; Duchin & Sosyura, 2014) 
Alternative market share measure 
Mkt.share proc. full 
Market share computed on annual proceeds raised in the corporate bond markets (in case of more underwriters 
all the proceeds are given each of them). 
Intensity of recapitalization measures 
Recapitalization Intensity Continuous variable computed as total funds received by the underwriter to total assets  
Recapitalization Amount Natural logarithm of the total funds received by the underwriter plus one: Ln (1+ Recapitalization amount) 
Reputational cutoff variables 
Reputable Top 10, 15 or 20 
Dummy that takes the value 1 if the underwriter bank is ranked in the top ten, fifteen or twenty respectively in 
the annual league tables based on the pre-bailout market shares. 
Reputable Top 5 -10, 10-15 or 
15- 20 
Dummy that takes the value 1 if the underwriter if the underwriter bank is ranked in the top 5 -10, 10-15 or 15-
20, respectively in the annual league tables based on the pre-bailout market shares 
 
Panel B. Determinants of underwriters’ market shares 
Abnormal bond spreads 
Weighted bond spreads in a three –year window.  
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 (𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑝𝑠) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)+ 𝛽3 ln(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)
+ 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑒𝑔. 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟
+  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 − 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑̂  




Weighted underwriting fees charged in a three –year window. 
𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 (𝑖𝑛 % 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)+ 𝛽3 ln(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)
+ 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 +  𝛽6𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
+ 𝛽7𝑁𝑒𝑔. 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠 = 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠 − 𝑓𝑒𝑒?̂? 
Dealogic 
Industry Specialization 






𝑗=1 (gij is the gross proceeds 
issued by the underwriter “i” in the two-digit SIC-industry “j” and Gi is the total gross 
proceeds issued by the underwriter “i”). 
Dealogic 
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Number Star Analyst 
Number of analysts reported by Institutional Investor for each underwriter in the All-Fixed 
Income Research Rankings. 
Dealogic 
UW Lender 
Dummy that takes the value 1 if the underwriter bank has taken also the role of lead manager 
in a loan issued by a firm in the same natural year. 
Thomson ONE 
Lending market share 
Computed on annual proceeds lent for each sample underwriter as lead manager in the 
European syndicate loan market (in case of more than one lender banks all the proceeds are 
equally split among all the lenders) 
Thomson ONE 
Weighted Private Placement 
Average ratio of Proceeds placed on private placement deals over total proceeds placed in 
a three –year window (t, t-1, t-2) 
Dealogic 
Weighted Multiple UW Deals 
Average ratio of Proceeds placed on multiple underwritten deals over total proceeds placed 
in a three –year window (t, t-1, t-2) 
Dealogic 
UW size 
Natural Logarithm of the total assets of the underwriter computed at the beginning of “t” 
period 
Bankscope 
Profitability (ROE) Ratio of Net Income to Total Equity computed at the beginning of “t” period Bankscope 
Liquidity 
Ratio of liquid Assets to Total Customer Deposits and Short Term Debt computed at the 
beginning of “t” period 
Bankscope 
Capital Adequacy Ratio of capital Funds to total assets at the beginning of “t” period Bankscope 
Operation Efficiency Cost to income ratio computed at the beginning of “t” period Bankscope 
Age 
Natural Logarithm of the years since the first issuance of the Underwriter or previous 
Underwriter since 1988  
Dealogic 
Listed Dummy that takes the value 1 if the underwriter bank is listed in a stock exchange market. Bankscope 
 
Panel C. Determinants of underwriters’ financial health 
UW size 
Natural Logarithm of the total assets of the underwriter computed at the beginning of “t” 
period 
Bankscope 
Profitability (ROE) Ratio of Net Income to Total Equity computed at the beginning of “t” period Bankscope 
Liquidity 
Ratio of liquid Assets to Total Customer Deposits and Short Term Debt computed at the 
beginning of “t” period 
Bankscope 
Capital Adequacy Ratio of capital Funds to total assets at the beginning of “t” period Bankscope 
Operation Efficiency Cost to income ratio computed at the beginning of “t” period Bankscope 
Age 
Natural Logarithm of the years since the first issuance of the Underwriter or previous 
Underwriter since 1988  
Dealogic 
Listed Dummy that takes the value 1 if the underwriter bank is listed in a stock exchange market. Bankscope 
 
Panel D. Firm-bank matching 
Bond size Natural logarithm of the bond proceeds Dealogic 
Maturity Natural logarithm of bond's time to maturity in years Dealogic 
Callability Dummy taking the value 1 if the bond includes a call option Dealogic 
Domestic placement Dummy taking the value 1 if the bond is placed domestically Dealogic 
Investment Grade Dummy taking the value 1 if the bond is an investment grade bond Dealogic 
Syndicate size Number of underwriters taking this role in the deal Compustat 
Firm size Natural logarithm of the issuer’s total assets at the end of the year before the bond issue Compustat 
Firm Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to equity at the end of the year before the bond issue Compustat 
Firm ROA 




Dummy taking the value 1 if the bond is the first bond issued by the issuer in the last 15 
years 
Dealogic 
Firm – Bank Shared 
nationality 
Dummy taking the value 1 if firm and bank are located in the same country Dealogic 
Prior Firm-UW Relationships 
Amount of bonds proceeds by bank i to firm j  2 years before the bond issue 




Amount of loans by bank i to firm j  2 years before the bond issue 
Total bonds proceeds by bank i to firm j  2 years before the bond issue 
 Thomson ONE 
 
Panel E. Other determinants of being bailed-out 
Interbank Lendings Loans and advances to banks to total assets at the beginning of period “t” Bankscope 
Regulatory Quality 
Ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development 
World Bank 
Stock Markets Volatility 
Standard deviation of the index price of the main stock market of the country in which the 
bank is domiciled 
OECD 
database 
GDP Growth Growth in the GDP of the country where the bank is domiciled World Bank 
Economic Freedom 
Composite Index that accounts for the rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency 
and open markets in order to offer a measure of how in economically free societies, 
governments allow labor, capital, and goods to move freely, and refrain from coercion or 











RECAPITALIZATION MEASURES RECEIVED BY UNDERWRITERS (2006 – 2013) 
Underwriter  State AID Date Amount Source 
Abanka Vipa Slovenia Dec. 2013 EUR 0.348 bn. European Commission 
ABN AMRO Netherlands July. 2009 EUR 0.5 bn. European Commission 
  Netherlands July. 2009 EUR 0.3 bn. European Commission 
  Netherlands Jan. 2010 EUR 1.2 bn. European Commission 
Alpha Bank Greece May. 2009 EUR 0.94 bn. European Commission 
  Greece May. 2012 EUR 1.9 bn. European Commission 
  Greece Dec. 2012 EUR 1.04 bn. European Commission 
  Greece June. 2013 EUR 4.04 bn. European Commission 
Banc of America U.S Oct. 2008 USD 15 bn. U.S Dep.of Treasury 
  U.S Jan. 2009 USD 10 bn. U.S Dep.of Treasury 
  U.S Jan. 2009 USD 20 bn. U.S Dep.of Treasury 
Banco BPI Portugal June. 2012 EUR 1.5 bn. European Commission 
Banco Grupo Cajatres Spain Dec. 2012 EUR 0.407 bn. European Commission 
Bankia Spain June. 2010 EUR 4.47 bn.  European Commission 
  Spain Sept. 2012 EUR 4.5 bn.  European Commission 
  Spain Dec. 2012 EUR 13.5 bn.  European Commission 
BAWAG Austria Dec. 2009 EUR 0.55 bn. European Commission 
BayernLB Germany Dec. 2008 EUR 10 bn.  European Commission 
BNP Paribas France Dec. 2008 EUR 2.55 bn. European Commission 
Credit Agricole France Dec. 2008 EUR 3.0 bn. European Commission 
Citigroup U.S Oct. 2008 USD 25 bn. U.S Dep.of Treasury 
  U.S Dec. 2008 USD 20 bn. U.S Dep.of Treasury 
Credit Mutuel France Dec. 2008 EUR 1.2 bn. European Commission 
Commerzbank Germany Dec. 2008 EUR 8.2 bn. European Commission 
  Germany January. 2009 EUR 1.8 bn. European Commission 
  Germany January. 2009 EUR 8.2 bn. European Commission 
Dexia Belgium, France and Luxembourg Oct. 2008 EUR 5.2 bn. European Commission 
  Belgium and France Dec. 2012 EUR 5.5 bn. European Commission 
Erste Group Bank  Austria March. 2009 EUR 1 bn. Finance Ministry of Austria 
Eurobank Ergasias  Greece May. 2009 EUR 0.95 bn. European Commission 
  Greece May. 2012 EUR 3.97 bn. European Commission 
  Greece Dec. 2012 EUR 1.34 bn. European Commission 
  Greece May. 2013 EUR 5.84 bn. European Commission 
Fortis Belgium and Luxembourg Sept. 2008 EUR 7.2 bn. European Commission 
  Netherlands Dec. 2008 EUR [0-2.75] bn - EUR [0.95-3.65] bn European Commission 
  Netherlands Feb. 2010 EUR 1.35 bn. European Commission 
Goldman Sachs U.S Oct. 2008 USD 10 bn. U.S Dep.of Treasury 
IKB Deutsche 
Industriebank 
Germany Feb. 2008 EUR 2.3 bn. European Commission 
ING Netherlands Nov.2008 EUR 10 bn. European Commission 
JPMorgan U.S Oct. 2008 USD 25 bn. U.S Dep.of Treasury 
KBC Belgium Dec. 2008 EUR 3.5 bn. European Commission 
  Belgium Jan. 2009 EUR 3.5 bn. European Commission 
LBBW Germany June. 2009 EUR 5 bn. European Commission 
Lloyds Banking Group United Kingdom Jan. 2009 GBP 17 bn. European Commission 
Millennium Investment 
Banking 
Portugal June. 2012 EUR 3 bn. European Commission 
Monte dei Paschi Italy Dec. 2009 EUR 1.9 bn. European Commission 
  Italy Dec. 2012 EUR 2 bn. European Commission 
Morgan Stanley U.S Oct. 2008 USD 10 bn. U.S Dep.of Treasury 
National Bank of Greece Greece May. 2009 EUR 0.35 bn. European Commission 
  Greece Dec. 2011 EUR 1 bn. European Commission 
  Greece May. 2012 EUR 7.4 bn. European Commission 
  Greece Dec. 2012 EUR 2.3 bn. European Commission 
  Greece May. 2013 EUR 8.7 bn. European Commission 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka Slovenia March. 2011 EUR 0.25 bn. European Commission 
  Slovenia July. 2012 EUR 0.39 mill. European Commission 
  Slovenia Dec. 2013 EUR 1.58 bn. European Commission 
Parex Banka Latvia Nov. 2008 LVL. 0.2 bn. European Commission 
  Latvia Dec. 2011 LVL. 0.049 bn European Commission 
RBS United Kingdom Oct. 2008 GBP 20 bn. European Commission 
  United Kingdom Nov. 2009 GBP 25.5 bn. European Commission 
Societe Generale France Dec. 2008 EUR 1.70 bn. European Commission 
UBS Switzerland Dec. 2008 SFR. 6 bn. Swiss National Bank 
Wells Fargo U.S Oct. 2008 USD 25 bn. U.S Dep.of Treasury 
WestLB Germany March. 2008 EUR 5 bn. European Commission 
Non recapitalized underwriters: Ahorro Corporación Financiera,ANZ,APG Algemene Pensioen Groep,Astrup Fearnley,Banca Akros,Intesa Sanpaolo,Banca 
March,Banco Caminos,Banco de Sabadell,Banco Espirito Santo,Banco Popular Espanol,Bank of China,Bankinter,Barclays,BBVA,Belfius Bank & Insurance,Bank 
of Montreal,Caixa Galicia,CaixaBank,CaixaBI,Canaccord Genuity Corp,Cecabank,Centrobanca,China Construction Bank,Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce,Close Brothers,Commonwealth Bank of Australia,Credit Suisse,Daiwa Securities,Danske Bank,DBS,Deutsche Bank,DNB Markets,Dresdner 
Kleinwort,DZ Bank,EuroLand Finance SA,GMP Capital,Helaba,HSBC,Industrial & Commercial Bank of China ,Investec Bank,Itau BBA,Jefferies 
LLC,KKR,Lehman Brothers,Macquarie Group,Mediobanca,Merrill Lynch,Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group,Mizuho,MM Warburg,National Australia Bank,National 
Bank Financial,Natixis,Nomura,Nordea Markets,Oddo & Cie,Pohjola Group,Pareto Securities,Petercam,Privatbanka as,Privredna Banka Zagreb,Quirin Bank 
AG,Rabobank,Raiffeisen Bank International,Raiffeisenlandesbank Oberoesterreich,Royal Bank of Canada,Renta 4,Santander,Scotiabank,SEB,Sociedad General de 
Valores y Cambios,Standard Chartered Bank,Steubing AG,Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group,Svenska Handelsbanken,Swedbank,Toronto 
Dominion,TradeRisks,UniCredit,Vontobel,Westpac,Zuercher Kantonalbank. 
64 recapitalization measures / 36 banks recapitalized / EUR 164.365 bn.,USD 160 bn.,GBP 62.5 bn., LVL 0.249 bn., SFR 6 bn.  
